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ESSAY
The Constitutional Case for Chevron
Deference
Jonathan R. Siegel*
Prominent figures in the legal world have recently attacked the
doctrine of Chevron deference, suggesting that Chevron is
unconstitutional because it interferes with a court's duty to exercise
"independent judgment" when interpreting statutes. This Essay shows
that Chevron's critics are mistaken. Chevron deference, properly
understood, does not prevent courts from interpreting statutes. An
interpretation that concludes that a statute delegates power to an
executive agency is still an interpretation. The power implicitly
delegated to an agency by an ambiguous statute is not the power to
interpret the statute, but the power to make a policy choice within the
limits set by the possible meanings of the statute.
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INTRODUCTION
An icon of administrative law is under attack. Prominent figures
in the legal world are attacking Chevron.' The critics could hardly have
gone after a bigger target. Chevron is the most-cited administrative law
case of all time. 2 Every law student who has taken a basic course in
administrative law is familiar with the principle of "Chevron deference,"
under which courts must defer to an executive agency's reasonable
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014). According to Westlaw databases, federal
courts of appeals have cited Chevron nearly five thousand times, as have federal district courts.
Law review articles have cited the case more than eight thousand times. The Supreme Court itself
has cited Chevron more than two hundred times. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2225, 2227 (1997) (calling Chevron "one of the
most important constitutional decisions in history").
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interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a statute the agency
administers. 3
The current attack on Chevron does not merely suggest that
courts should limit the case's application. It is true that the Supreme
Court has recently limited Chevron in various ways-it has, for
example, limited the kinds of agency pronouncements that are entitled
to deference, 4 and it has declared that some matters are so momentous
that Chevron does not apply to them.5 But the latest attack goes far
beyond that. The latest claim is that the very concept of Chevron
deference is unconstitutional. Judges, legislators, and scholars have
suggested that the Constitution imposes a duty on courts to exercise
"independent judgment" when interpreting a statute. 6 This duty,
Chevron's critics say, derives from Article III's vesting of the "judicial
Power" in the courts, and it forbids courts from deferring to an agency's
interpretation. 7
This argument has been advanced at the highest levels of the
judiciary. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas made the argument
in two recent cases.8 He asserted that the judicial power "requires a
court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and
expounding upon the laws," and that "Chevron deference precludes
judges from exercising that judgment."9 Justice Neil Gorsuch made the
same argument during his time as a federal appellate judge. In a
concurring opinion, then-Judge Gorsuch stated that "under
Chevron, ... courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law."10
This duty, he asserted, is "likely compelled by the Constitution itself."1 1
Gorsuch was, of course, recently elevated to the Supreme Court, 12 So
now there are two Supreme Court Justices who have suggested that
Chevron is unconstitutional.
Members of Congress have made similar arguments. In the
114th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the "Separation
3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
4. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
5. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
6. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
8. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217, 1219, 1224 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712.
10. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
11. Id.
12. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cclRQ9B-AEA4].
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of Powers Restoration Act" ("SOPRA"), 13 which, if enacted, would have
overruled Chevron statutorily. SOPRA would have required courts
reviewing agency actions to decide all questions of law de novo. 14 The
House Report accompanying the bill suggested that Chevron is
inconsistent with the principle of Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say
what the law is."15 The Report also states that Chevron "is difficult, if
not impossible, to square with the Framers' intent in the Constitution
to create a government of definite, limited, and separated powers." 16
SOPRA did not become law in the 114th Congress, but it has been
reintroduced in the 115th Congress,1 7 and it has once again passed the
House. 18
Finally, scholars have also chimed in. Most notably, Professor
Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School has argued that Chevron
deference is unconstitutional. 19 Like the other authorities cited above,
Hamburger argues that Chevron unconstitutionally prevents judges
from fulfilling their duty to exercise independent judgment when
interpreting statutes. 20 He also asserts that Chevron deference violates
the Constitution's Due Process Clause by requiring judges to exercise
13. H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016).
14. Id. § 2(3).
15. H.R. REP. No. 114-622, at 4 (2016).
16. Id. at 5.
17. H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017).
18. In the 115th Congress, SOPRA passed the House as Title II of the Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2017. See H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). There appears to have been no House
committee report accompanying the bill in the 115th Congress.
19. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016). Professor
Hamburger's work is the leading academic exposition of the current constitutional attack on
Chevron. See also Charles J. Cooper, The Flaws of Chevron Deference, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL'Y 307,
310-11 (2016) ("Chevron is an impermissible abdication of judicial duty."); Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative State, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 497-507 (2016)
(attacking Chevron as contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that an attempt by
Congress to enact Chevron doctrine by statute would raise "a serious constitutional question," and
stating that Chevron's "wholesale transfer of legal interpretation from courts to agencies" violates
"the most basic notion of judicial review that it is the province of the courts to say what the law
is"); cf. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 823-24 (2011) (noting that Chevron deference is sometimes
justified on the theory that ambiguous statutes represent a delegation of lawmaking power to
agencies, but questioning whether this theory can justify judicial deference to executive
interpretation of treaties and statutes in foreign relations law); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2085, 2131 (2002) (briefly suggesting
that "Chevron may well be wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law. Perhaps ... de novo
judicial review of federal questions is constitutionally required, so Chevron deference would be
impermissible even if Congress explicitly enacted it"). For an analysis that puts the constitutional
attack on Chevron in the context of the broader attack currently being made against the whole
administrative state, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term-Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-28, 31-33, 39-42 (2017).
20. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1209-10.
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systematically biased judgment in favor of the government. 21 Chevron,
Hamburger concludes, involves such "clear violations of Article III and
the Fifth Amendment" 22 that judges who want to follow the decision
should resign. 23
Thus, powerful figures in the legal world have suggested that a
fundamental principle of administrative law is not merely incorrect but
in fact violates the Constitution. These suggestions demand a response.
This Essay makes the case for the constitutionality of Chevron
deference.
The first step of the argument was made long ago-indeed,
before Chevron itself. In his classic article, Marbury and the
Administrative State,24 Professor Henry Monaghan made the key
observation that ambiguity in a statute entrusted to an administrative
agency for enforcement is best understood as a delegation of power to
the agency. 25 A year later, Chevron endorsed this concept by holding
that an ambiguous provision in an agency statute should be deemed to
constitute an implicit delegation of power to the agency to fill the gap
left by Congress. 26 Thus, the most basic reason why agencies should
have the power to resolve ambiguities in provisions of statutes they
administer is that Congress should be understood to have delegated this
power to agencies.
This observation, however, does not end the debate. Fully aware
of this argument, Chevron's critics deny it. According to the critics, the
Constitution vests courts with the power and duty "to say what the law
is," and no one, not even Congress, can transfer this power from the
judiciary to the executive. 27 Thus, even if Congress were to enact
Chevron as an express, statutorily mandated rule of statutory
construction, it would, the critics say, be unconstitutional and
ineffective.
This Essay argues that Chevron's critics have misunderstood the
limits of the judicial and legislative roles in the interpretation of
statutes. Four points are key: First, even fully accepting the critics'
suggestion that courts must exercise independent judgment when
construing a statute, sometimes the best construction of a statute is
21. Id. at 1211.
22. Id. at 1242.
23. Id. at 1248-49.
24. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
25. Id. at 26; see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (noting that
Congress may not delegate legislative power to an agency but may delegate "decisionmaking
authority").
26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
27. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1235.
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that the statute vests discretion in the executive. Under this view, when
a court interprets an administrative statute, finds it to be ambiguous,
and defers to an agency's reasonable construction of the statute, the
court is fully exercising its power and duty to interpret the statute; it is
simply doing so using a rule of statutory interpretation under which the
correct interpretation of an ambiguity in an administrative statute is
as an additional delegation of authority to the agency. In such a case, a
court properly performs the judicial function by recognizing the
discretion conferred by the statute. An interpretation that determines
that a statute delegates power to the executive is still an
interpretation. 2 8
Second, the first point does require a conceptual shift in the
understanding of the kind of discretion conferred on an administrative
agency by an ambiguous statute. It is often said-perhaps even in
Chevron itself-that courts must treat an ambiguous agency statute as
an implicit delegation to the agency of the power to interpret the
statute. 29 This understanding opens Chevron deference to the critique
described above. To address the critique, courts must understand
ambiguity in an agency statute a little differently. Courts should not
infer that Congress has delegated the interpretive power to agencies.
But where an agency statute is ambiguous, the court is to interpret the
statute as creating a menu of permissible actions and delegating to the
agency the power to choose among them.30
Third, a different route to the same conclusion as the first two
points is to recognize that policymaking power conferred by statutory
ambiguity is no different than policymaking power conferred by express
statutory language, which even the critics accept as permissible insofar
as Article III is concerned. Congress expressly vests policymaking
discretion in agencies all the time. 31
Finally, once these points are agreed, the only remaining
difficulty is determining when a statute is best understood as conferring
discretion on the executive. This is where the final point comes in:
Congress may prescribe rules of interpretation for the statutes it
passes. Like any giver of instructions, Congress may say how its
instructions are to be understood. Congress could, therefore, provide
that an ambiguous instruction to an agency is to be understood as
28. See infra Section I.C.1.
29. See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Section H.C.2.
31. See infra Section II.E.
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vesting discretion in the agency to choose among the reasonably
permissible interpretations of the instruction. 32
Part I of this Essay explains the Chevron deference principle and
recounts the debate over it. Part II provides the response to Chevron's
critics.
I. CHEVRON AND ITS CRITICS
Chevron is so familiar that only a brief recital of its key points is
necessary. This Part provides this brief background and then explains
the critiques of Chevron that important figures have recently advanced.
A. The Principle of Chevron Deference
Courts reviewing actions by federal administrative agencies
have long faced the question of what consideration to give to the
agencies' own interpretations of the statutes they administer. By
necessity, agencies must interpret these statutes. 33 The statutes tell the
agencies what to do, so the agencies must interpret them to know what
to do. Justiciability and administrative law principles normally ensure
that a court will have an opportunity to encounter such a statute only
after the agency has taken some action under it.34 Thus, by the time a
court has occasion to construe a statute administered by a federal
agency, the agency itself will typically have given some construction to
the statute.
For a long time, going back at least to the nineteenth century,
federal courts gave "respectful consideration" or "great respect" to an
agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute that the agency
administered. 35 An agency's construction was, however, "not
controlling." 3 6 Final interpretive power rested with the courts, because
"the judicial department has imposed upon it by the constitution, the
solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and . .. where [a
32. See infra Section II.E.
33. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5.
34. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (holding that federal courts cannot give
advisory opinions); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) ("[N]o one
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted.").
35. E.g., Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 382 (1874); United States v. Dickson, 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 161 (1841). As early as 1827, the Supreme Court said, "In the construction of a
doubtful and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to
act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great
respect," Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827), although that case
concerned the construction of a state statute by commissioners appointed to administer it.
36. Smythe, 90 U.S. at 382.
943
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
court's] judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is
not at liberty to surrender, or to waive [that duty]."37 Thus, where a
court's interpretation of a statute differed from that of the agency that
administered the statute in the first instance, the court was empowered
to enforce its own interpretation.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the question of the
degree of respect to be given by courts to an agency's interpretation of
a statute "produced a large number of statutory interpretation opinions
that defy easy reconciliation." 3 8 Sometimes the Supreme Court stated
that "the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong." 39 In other cases the Court said that the amount of deference a
court should give to an agency's interpretation of a statute "will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."40 But as late as 1983-just a year before Chevron-the Court
reiterated the view that an agency's interpretation, though entitled to
respect, was not controlling. 41
Chevron changed this rule. In Chevron, the Supreme Court held
that when a court reviews a federal agency's interpretation of a statute
administered by the agency, the court must follow a two-step process.
First, in "Chevron Step One," the court must ask whether Congress has
by statute clearly and directly addressed the precise question at issue.
If so, both the court and the agency are bound by Congress's clear
statutory instructions. 42 If, however, the governing statute is "silent or
ambiguous" as to the specific question at issue, the court, applying
"Chevron Step Two," asks only whether the agency's construction of the
statute is "permissible."4 3 In such a case, the reviewing court must
uphold the agency's construction provided it is a reasonable
37. Dickson, 40 U.S. at 162; see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840)
("If a suit should come before [this Court] which involved the construction of any of these laws ...
the Court certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a
department.").
38. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453 (1989).
39. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
40. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
41. Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624,
635 (1983).
42. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron
did not use the terms "Step One" and "Step Two." Those terms later became common through use
by lower courts and commentators. See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
43. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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interpretation of the statute, even if it is not what the court regards as
the best interpretation. 4 4 The statutory ambiguity is to be regarded as
an implicit delegation to the agency of the power to "elucidate" the
statute.45
Thus was born the doctrine of "Chevron deference." The doctrine
has many nuances that the Supreme Court elaborated in subsequent
cases. For example, the Court has considered (and sometimes changed
its mind about) issues such as whether judicial deference varies
depending on whether the agency has maintained a consistent
interpretation or has changed its interpretation over time, 4 6 and how
the deference principle operates when an agency's interpretation of a
statute differs from a prior judicial interpretation. 4 7 The Court has also
determined that Chevron deference does not apply to every agency
interpretation of a statute the agency administers. The structure of
deference, the Court has held, varies depending on the process the
agency used to come up with its interpretation. 48 In addition, the Court
has determined that some matters are so momentous that the principle
of Chevron deference does not apply to them, because the principle is
grounded in the assumption that statutory ambiguity represents an
implicit delegation of power to an agency, and some matters are so
important that a court could not believe that Congress delegated them
to an agency for decision.49 These determinations that the structure of
44. Id. at 843 n.11, 844.
45. Id. at 844.
46. Compare Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) ("Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation
under the Chevron framework."), with Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)
("mhe consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.").
Cf. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016) (declining to defer to an
agency's changed position because the agency had not adequately explained the reason for the
change).
47. Compare Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion."), with Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992)
("Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our
prior determination of the statute's meaning." (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990))).
48. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (noting that Chevron deference
applies only "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority").
49. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). Some scholars have understood decisions discussed in this
paragraph as signaling a more general judicial concern about the administrative state. E.g.,
Metzger, supra note 19, at 28 (stating that King and other decisions "contribute to the sense of a
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Chevron deference does not always apply have given rise to what is
sometimes called "Chevron Step Zero," an initial step in which a court
must determine whether the other two steps apply.50
Chevron has also spawned an enormous scholarly literature that
has investigated innumerable aspects of the decision. Scholars have, for
example, debated whether Chevron actually changed the way courts
review agency statutory interpretation,5 1 investigated the Step Zero
question of when Chevron applies, 52 and studied Chevron's impact
empirically.53
But for purposes of this Essay, these many nuances and
subsidiary issues are of no consequence. Chevron's current critics do not
challenge mere details of the doctrine. They challenge its fundamental
essence. The critics assert that the very concept of Chevron deference is
unconstitutional. They claim that where a court's best understanding
of a statute, based on the court's independent judgment, differs from
the construction placed on the statute by an administrative agency, the
Constitution requires the court to enforce its own interpretation and
prohibits it from deferring to the agency's, even if the agency's
construction is a "permissible" or "reasonable" interpretation of the
statute.
B. Chevron Attacked
As noted in the Introduction, Chevron's critics include extremely
important figures in the legal world. Supreme Court Justices, members
growing judicial resistance to administrative governance and judicial concern over the
constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state").
50. See, e.g., Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)
(discussing "Chevron step zero"); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (introducing discussion of "Chevron step zero" doctrine); Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
51. Compare Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1257-58 (1997) ("[E]xperience has not borne out the early predictions of a sea
change in judicial deference. A strong revisionist view has emerged, interpreting Chevron as less
deferential than many initially assumed."), and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 93 (2011) ("There is no empirical
support for the widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of
agency actions."), with Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 284 (1986) ("Chevron has quickly become a decision of great importance. . .
52. E.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50.
53. E.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083
(2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727
(2010).
2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR CHEVRON
of Congress, and noted scholars have all joined in. For the purposes of
this Essay, the members of this group will be dubbed "the critics."
1. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas laid the groundwork for his attack on Chevron
in the case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n.5 4 The case was not
actually about Chevron deference; it concerned interpretation of agency
rules, whereas Chevron is about interpretation of statutes.55
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas's lengthy concurring opinion, which
expressed concern about "protecting the structure of the
Constitution,"5 6 explored some themes related to the Chevron debate.
In particular, Justice Thomas noted that under the Seminole Rock
doctrine, courts give deference to an agency's interpretation of one of its
own rules, provided the interpretation is not plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the rule it interprets.57 Justice Thomas expressed
concern about the way the Court's "steady march toward deference"
risked "compromising our constitutional structure."5 8
The Framers, Justice Thomas explained, relied on separation of
powers to secure liberty.59 The Framers assigned the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers to separate bodies designed to act as
checks upon each other.60 Judicial deference to an agency's
interpretation of the agency's own regulations, Justice Thomas said,
"amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a 'check' on
the political branches." 61
54. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213-25 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The attack goes
back earlier than that, but Perez brought it into the limelight.
55. The main point of Perez was the "Paralyzed Veterans doctrine," a creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C.
Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("This case involves just the proper interpretation
of the regulation."). Under this doctrine, an agency desiring to interpret one of its own legislative
rules could issue an initial "interpretive" rule without using notice-and-comment rulemaking, but
once the agency had done so, it had to use notice and comment to issue any subsequent interpretive
rule changing its initial interpretation. Id. at 586; see also Alaska Prof'1 Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177
F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine with approval). In
Perez, the Supreme Court rejected the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. It held that the doctrine was
incompatible with the Administrative Procedure Act's exemption of interpretive rules from the
notice-and-comment process. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206-07.
56. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 1213; see Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945) (relying on
agency's interpretation of its regulation).
58. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1214-15.
59. Id. at 1216.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1217.
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The Constitution's assignment of the judicial power to the
courts, Justice Thomas argued, "requires a court to exercise its
independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws." 62
The Framers knew that laws would often be ambiguous, and "[t]he
judicial power was understood to include the power to resolve these
ambiguities over time." 6 3 The Constitution insulates judges from
pressures that might bias them so as to protect the courts' ability to
exercise independent judgment.64 The judiciary, Justice Thomas
concluded, "is duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying
the law."66
For these reasons, Justice Thomas criticized Seminole Rock
deference. 66 Such deference, he argued, "amounts to a transfer of the
judge's exercise of interpretive judgment to the agency."67 Deference
also "undermines the judicial 'check' on the political branches."68 Not
even Congress, Justice Thomas asserted, could empower agencies to
interpret their own regulations and require courts to defer to their
interpretations, because the Constitution assigns the power to issue
judicially binding interpretations of law to the courts, not to Congress.
"Lacking the power itself, [Congress] cannot delegate that power to an
agency."69
Justice Thomas had no occasion in Perez to consider the
appropriateness of Chevron deference, as opposed to Seminole Rock
deference. But the occasion soon arose. Three months after Perez, the
Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA, 70 in which the Court applied
Chevron in the course of striking down an EPA rule.7 1 Justice Thomas
again wrote a concurring opinion. Applying the principles he had laid
out in Perez, he questioned the constitutionality of Chevron deference. 72
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1217-19.
65. Id. at 1219.
66. Id. at 1217-25.
67. Id. at 1219.
68. Id. at 1220.
69. Id. at 1224.
70. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
71. Michigan concerned the EPA's interpretation of a statutory requirement that it regulate
certain emissions from power plants only if doing so was "appropriate and necessary." Id. at 2704.
The EPA decided that it could determine whether regulating the emissions was "appropriate and
necessary" without considering regulatory costs. Id. at 2705-06. The Supreme Court rejected the
EPA's interpretation of "appropriate and necessary." Id. at 2711-12. The Court held that, even
applying the principle of Chevron deference, the agency's decision was not "within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation." Id. at 2706-07, 2712 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.
Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014).
72. Id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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He reiterated that the Constitution's assignment of the judicial power
to the courts requires courts to exercise "independent judgment" when
interpreting the laws. 3 Chevron deference, he noted, precludes courts
from doing so. Therefore, Chevron deference transfers the judicial
power to "say what the law is" from the judiciary to the executive-a
transfer that, Justice Thomas argued, is "in tension with" the Vesting
Clause of Article III.74
Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Article III problem might
be ameliorated by regarding an agency's act of interpreting a statute it
administers as "formulation of policy" rather than as "interpretation."7 5
However, Justice Thomas argued, conceiving the agency's action that
way merely trades one constitutional problem for another. Although it
might solve the Article III problem, it creates an Article I problem, for
Article I vests Congress, not the executive, with the legislative power. 76
Either way, Justice Thomas concluded, the Court has strayed "further
and further from the Constitution."7 7
Thus, Justice Thomas has strongly criticized Chevron deference,
suggesting that the doctrine is not merely erroneous but
unconstitutional. Justice Thomas's views regarding Chevron are in
keeping with his role as the Justice most willing to question whether
fundamental, long-standing doctrines are in keeping with originalist
constitutional principles.78 Moreover, with regard to Chevron, Justice
Thomas has important allies, starting with his newest colleague,
Justice Gorsuch.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
75. Id. at 2712-13.
76. Id. at 2713.
77. Id. at 2714.
78. For example, in a landmark case about the meaning of the Constitution's Commerce
Clause, Justice Thomas wrote a solo concurrence expressing interest in reviving the purported
original understanding of the distinction between "commerce" and manufacturing, mining, and
agriculture. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-88, 598 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas stated that the Court should reconsider the Commerce Clause "without totally
rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence," thus making unclear how far he would
go in this direction. Id. at 585. However, his suggestion, if adopted, could call into question the
constitutionality of an enormous portion of the federal government's business. Similarly, he has
long been the Justice most willing to suggest the need for significantly strengthening the
nondelegation doctrine. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (solo concurrence) ("On a future day ... I would be willing to address the question
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of
separation of powers."). Again, this view, if adopted, could have enormous impact on the
constitutionality of much of the federal government's operations.
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2. Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch expressed his views on Chevron when he was a
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the case of
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.79 The case concerned an immigration law
issue, the precise details of which are unimportant here, and the
administrative law principle of Brand X, which allows an agency to
"overrule" a judicial opinion by issuing a new, reasonable interpretation
of a statute it administers, even if that interpretation differs from a
prior judicial interpretation. 0 Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the court
addressed the Brand Xissues raised by the case.8 1
Justice Gorsuch then took the unusual step of writing a
concurrence to his own opinion. 82 Like Justice Thomas's opinions in
Perez and Michigan, Justice Gorsuch's concurrence raised larger
questions about the impact of deference doctrines on the separation of
powers. Chevron and Brand X, Justice Gorsuch complained, "permit
executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the
framers' design." 83 Reaching back to the foundational case of Marbury
v. Madison, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that under that case,
resolution of questions of private legal rights is a judicial function.84
Chevron, he said, "seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the
abdication of the judicial duty."85
Justice Gorsuch did not quote Marbury's famous statement that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,"86 but he alluded to it implicitly. Under Chevron,
he observed, courts decide whether an agency statute is ambiguous and
whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.87 But, he plaintively
79. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). For simplicity, and to avoid constant repetition of the
awkward phrase "then-Judge Gorsuch," Justice Gorsuch is referred to as "Justice Gorsuch" in the
description of this case, even though he was an appellate judge at the time.
80. Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005).
81. Gutierrez-Brizuela asked whether, when an agency issues a new interpretation of a
statute that contradicts a prior judicial interpretation, the agency may apply its new interpretation
retroactively to transactions that occurred when the contrary judicial interpretation apparently
controlled. 834 F.3d at 1143-44. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the court, expressed some distaste
for Brand X, see id. at 1143 (suggesting that the doctrine is out of step with "our constitutional
history"), but determined that even accepting it, retroactive application of the new agency
interpretation was not permitted. Id. at 1148.
82. Id. at 1149-58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 1149.
84. Id. at 1151 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803)).
85. Id. at 1152.
86. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
87. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152.
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asked, "where in all this does a court interpret the law and say what it
is?"88
Thus, like Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch regarded Chevron
deference as incompatible with the Article III duty of courts to interpret
the law. Also like Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch argued that
although the Article III problem might be ameliorated by positing that
when an agency gives content to an ambiguous statute, it is not
"interpreting" the statute but rather exercising delegated power to
make policy, such a solution raises a delegation problem. So regarded,
Chevron might not violate Article III, but it would likely violate Article
1.89
Justice Gorsuch's views were already of some interest when he
expressed them as a Tenth Circuit judge. But now that he is a Supreme
Court Justice, that interest is greatly increased. Two Supreme Court
Justices have now questioned one of the cornerstones of administrative
law.
3. Congress
The attacks on Chevron are not coming solely from the judiciary.
Some members of Congress share the view that Chevron deference is
illegitimate. These members are trying to overturn Chevron statutorily
by passing SOPRA, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act. This bill,
which passed the House of Representatives in both the 114th and 115th
Congresses,90 would amend § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Currently, that section simply provides that a reviewing court "shall
decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions." Under the proposed amendment, the section
would more elaborately provide:
The reviewing court shall ... decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies. If
the reviewing court determines that a statutory or regulatory provision relevant to its
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1152-56.
90. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. SOPRA passed the House on votes that
ran almost completely along party lines. See 162 CONG. REC. H4694-95 (daily ed. July 12, 2016);
Final Vote Results for Roll Call 416, HOUSE CLERK (vote recorded July 12, 2016, 4:30 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll416.xml [https://perma.cc/BRR4-G8R8] (showing that SOPRA
passed the House in the 114th Congress with 239 Republican and 1 Democratic vote in favor, and
171 Democratic votes against); 163 CONG. REC. H371-72 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2017); Final Vote
Results for Roll Call 45, HOUSE CLERK (vote recorded Jan. 11, 2017, 6:46 PM),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll045.xml [https://perma.cc/9TC7-YN7E] (showing that the bill of
which SOPRA was a part passed the House in the 115th Congress with 233 Republican and 5
Democratic votes in favor, and 183 Democratic votes against). This suggests that SOPRA has not
become law because it lacks the votes to overcome a Democratic filibuster in the Senate.
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decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the court shall not interpret that gap or ambiguity
as an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rule making authority and shall not
rely on such gap or ambiguity as a justification either for interpreting agency authority
expansively or for deferring to the agency's interpretation on the question of law. 9 1
Thus, under the proposed amendment, § 706 would make clear
that a reviewing court must interpret statutes de novo and must not
give deference to agency interpretations.
The stated motivation behind SOPRA echoes the opinions of
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch described above. The House Report on
SOPRA in the 114th Congress suggested that Chevron deference is
inconsistent with the judicial duty, declared in Marbury v. Madison, to
"say what the law is."92 The idea that an ambiguity in an agency statute
represents an implicit delegation to the agency of power to determine
what the ambiguous terms mean is, the report said, "difficult, if not
impossible, to square with" the separation of powers, 93 for if the
Constitution assigns the interpretive power to the judicial branch, then
Congress cannot reassign that power to the executive branch. 94
4. Scholars
Finally, scholars have weighed in on the debate over Chevron's
constitutionality. 95 Most notably, Professor Philip Hamburger of
Columbia recently published an article strongly attacking Chevron.96
Hamburger's administrative law work is central to the debate and,
indeed, was a precursor to the judicial criticisms of Chevron discussed
above. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch relied on Hamburger's
earlier work in their opinions questioning Chevron deference. 97
Hamburger asserts that Chevron deference is unconstitutional
for two reasons. First, like the Justices discussed above, Hamburger
argues that Chevron deference is incompatible with the judicial duty,
imposed by Article III of the Constitution, to exercise independent
judgment when addressing questions of law.98 Hamburger relies
heavily on the view that judges hold an "office," specifically, "an office
91. H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (engrossed in House, Jan. 11, 2017).
92. H.R. REP. No. 114-622, at 4 (2016).
93. Id. at 4-5.
94. Id. at 5.
95. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
96. Hamburger, supra note 19.
97. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1218 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDIcIAL DUTY 507,508 (2008)); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 287-91 (2014)). The opinions cited Professor Hamburger's
books, not the more recent article discussed here.
98. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1206-1210.
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of judgment, in which they must exercise their own independent
judgment." 99 According to Hamburger, "the office or duty of a judge to
exercise his independent judgment was the very identity of a judge,"
and a judge "therefore cannot defer to the judgment of an
administrative agency without abandoning his office as a judge."100 The
conventional notion that Congress delegates interpretive authority to
administrative agencies is, Hamburger asserts, irrelevant. Even if
Congress has delegated such authority to agencies, the delegation is
ineffective, because Congress cannot displace a judge's constitutional
duty to exercise independent judgment. 101
Hamburger's other argument is that Chevron's requirement that
courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes they administer
necessarily produces "systematically biased judgment." 102 Agencies are
often (though not always) parties in cases in which their interpretations
are judicially reviewed, and in such cases Chevron requires courts to
defer to the views of a party to the case before them. 10 3 We would,
Hamburger observes, ordinarily regard judicial deference to a party as
outrageous. 104 The bias produced by Chevron is no different,
Hamburger argues, and it constitutes a "brazen violation" of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 105
For these reasons, Hamburger argues that Chevron deference is
unconstitutional. Hamburger, indeed, concludes that Chevron
deference is "one of the most dramatic departures from the ideals of
judicial office and due process in the history of the common law," 106 and
that if judges "do not want to exercise their own independent judgment,
but instead want to exercise systematic bias, they should resign."10 7
This prescription would likely require a very substantial number of
inferior federal judges to resign, but in Hamburger's view the "most
basic requirements" of judging include "avoid[ing] systematic bias" and
"exercis [ing] ... independent judgment," and judges "unwilling to
99. Id. at 1206.
100. Id. at 1209.
101. See id. at 1213; cf. Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 19, at 499, 507 (recognizing that a
statute mandating a court to accede to the interpretation of an agency rather than its own
independent judgment "would be controversial, to say the least"); Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at
2131 (contemplating that "perhaps de novo judicial review of federal questions is constitutionally
required, so Chevron deference would be impermissible even if Congress explicitly enacted it").
102. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1211.
103. Id. at 1211-12.
104. Id. at 1212.
105. Id. at 1212-13.
106. Id. at 1247.
107. Id. at 1248.
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adhere" to these requirements "have no business pretending to be
judges and should get off the bench."108
Among academics, the other leading challenge to Chevron's
constitutionality is a much earlier work by Professor Cynthia Farina of
Cornell. 109 Unlike the current critics, Farina does not see Chevron
deference as a violation of Article III. She suggests instead that Chevron
threatens to violate the nondelegation doctrine, although her point is
somewhat different from that of the current critics. The essence of
Farina's argument is that in Chevron the Supreme Court failed to
consider whether the assumption that every ambiguity in an agency
statute constitutes an implicit delegation of power to the agency would
contribute to the ever-increasing accumulation of power in the
president in a way that threatens the balance of powers among the
three branches of government. Farina observes that the nondelegation
doctrine was originally understood to prohibit any delegation of the
legislative power. In early cases, apparent delegations were approved
on the basis that they delegated "nonlegislative" power such as the
power to find the facts from which statutory consequences flowed. 110
Over time, however, the Supreme Court began to approve delegations
on the different basis that delegation of legislative power is permitted
provided Congress lays down the "intelligible principle" by which the
power is to be exercised, 11 and ultimately the test became whether the
statutory standards were sufficiently precise that a court could say
whether they were being obeyed. 11 2
Thus, Farina says, the Court permitted legislative power to be
statutorily delegated so long as it would be adequately controlled, and
a "crucial aspect" of such control "was judicial policing of the terms of
the statute." 113 As Farina sees it, nondelegation cases reached a
"constitutional accommodation," and that accommodation "implied that
principal power to say what the statute means must rest outside the
agency, in the courts."114 Chevron, Farina suggests, is "fundamentally
incongruous" with this constitutional accommodation that approved
delegations of so much power to agencies.115
Moreover, Farina suggests, Chevron's deference principle must
be evaluated in the context of the overall balance of powers. The
108. Id. at 1249.
109. Farina, supra note 38.
110. Id. at 480-82.
111. Id. at 483-84.
112. Id. at 485.
113. Id. at 487.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 487-88, 497-98.
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Constitution's Framers, fearful of legislative tyranny, imposed
stringent controls on the exercise of legislative power, 116 but they
created less constraint on the executive power, so that the executive
could act with necessary "dispatch, coordination, initiative, and
consistency." 117 As a result, while Congress enjoys "legislative
supremacy" and theoretically has power to control and reverse almost
any agency decision, the president has far more practical power to
control agencies.11 8 Chevron deference therefore contributes to a
dangerous accumulation of power in a single branch, namely, the
executive. 119
Farina's critique of Chevron is sufficiently distinct from those of
the others discussed above that when this Essay refers to Chevron's
"critics" without qualification, she is not included. Her arguments will
be addressed separately. 12 0 The "critics" are Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, Professor Hamburger, and the members of Congress
supporting SOPRA.
II. CHEVRON DEFENDED
Chevron's critics are demanding nothing less than a revolution
in administrative law. Chevron has been a mainstay of the field for over
thirty years. 121 The critics do not wish to alter the details of Chevron
doctrine. They propose no subtle refinement of Chevron's Step One or
Step Two or Step Zero. They want the very concept of Chevron deference
declared unconstitutional.
Of course, a determination that Chevron is unconstitutional
would be somewhat surprising, because it would have to come from the
very body that adopted Chevron in the first place, the Supreme Court
itself.122 And Chevron was unanimous, too. 12 3 But it would not be the
116. Id. at 508.
117. Id. at 507.
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id. at 525-28.
120. See infra Section II.F.4.
121. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
122. Congress could certainly overturn Chevron statutorily, by passing SOPRA. The Supreme
Court has never suggested that the principle of Chevron is constitutionally compelled. Rather, the
Court has justified Chevron as an understanding of Congress's intent in passing an ambiguous
agency statute. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Therefore, Congress could overturn Chevron by statutorily negating its supposed intent, which is
what SOPRA would do. Cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2129 (agreeing that Congress could
overturn Chevron by statute). But Congress could not hold Chevron unconstitutional-only the
Supreme Court could do that.
123. See 467 U.S. at 839. Only six of the nine Justices participated in Chevron, see id., but all
the participating Justices joined in the opinion, and the other three subsequently joined opinions
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first time the Supreme Court struck down one of its own doctrines as
unconstitutional. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 124 the Supreme Court said
that it was overruling the prior doctrine of Swift v. Tyson1 25 because
"the unconstitutionality of [that doctrine] has now been made clear." 126
So a confession of constitutional error from the Court is possible.
It is therefore vitally important to respond to the critique of
Chevron deference. The key insight is that even when a court interprets
a legal directive de novo, the court may discover that the best
construction of the directive is that it vests decisionmaking power in
some other body. In such a case, the court fulfills its judicial duty by
accepting the determination of the other body, provided that
determination is within the power vested in that body. The court in such
a case does not shirk its duty to construe the legal directive de novo;
rather, the court, having fulfilled its duty, finds that the governing law
requires it to accept the other body's exercise of the discretion vested in
it.127
A. Clearing Away the Underbrush
Before turning to the main argument, it is important to clarify
two points. One is a point of potential confusion about terminology. The
other sets the terms of the debate.
1. The Meaning of "Interpret"
When asking where the Constitution vests the power to
interpret statutes, one must distinguish between two possible meanings
of the term "interpret." On the one hand, the usual meaning of
"interpret" is "to explain or tell the meaning of." 1 2 8 In this sense, an
agency interprets a statute whenever it reads the statute and
determines what the statute means so that it may apply the statute.
This Essay will refer to this sense of "interpret" as the "simple sense" of
the word.
On the other hand, in discussions of Chevron deference,
"interpret" is also used in a more technical sense, which might be
applying the Chevron deference principle. E.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980
(1986).
124. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
125. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
126. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
127. See infra Sections IIB-C.
128. This is the first definition of "interpret" given by Merriam-Webster. See Interpret,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interpret (last
visited Jan. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T2RT-2PFE].
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rendered as "to give definitive or controlling meaning to." In this sense,
asking whether Congress has given an agency the power to interpret a
statute is asking whether Congress has authorized the agency to
definitively resolve ambiguities in the statute, with the consequence
that a court must uphold the agency's interpretation even if it does not
match the interpretation the court would give to the statute on its
own. 129 This Essay will refer to this meaning of "interpret" as the
''strong sense" of the word.
There can be no question that executive agencies are authorized
to interpret statutes they administer in the simple sense of determining
what the statutes mean. Indeed, agencies are obliged to do so. After all,
statutes tell agencies what to do. An agency must interpret the statutes
it administers so that it can know how to act under them. 1 3 0 Even when
the meaning of a statute is perfectly clear, an agency is still interpreting
the statute when it looks at the ink marks that make up the statutory
text, understands those ink marks as letters, the letters as words, and
the words as having meaning. Every act of reading a statute and
applying it is necessarily an act of interpretation.
Moreover, where the statute is ambiguous, it is still incumbent
upon the agency to interpret the statute in the simple sense of making
a determination of the statute's meaning. Again, the agency must
determine the meaning of the statute in order to know what to do as it
applies the statute. It would not be practical for an agency to run to a
court every time it needed to resolve an ambiguity in a statute it
administered, and besides, even if the agency wanted to do so,
principles of justiciability would prevent the court from providing
advice to the agency about the statute's meaning outside the context of
a particular case. 131
Thus, there can be no doubt that agencies can, and indeed must,
interpret the statutes they administer, in the simple sense of the word
"interpret." This point is not controversial. Even Chevron's critics
recognize that "other branches of Government have the authority and
obligation to interpret the law." 132
129. Cf. Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984). Of
course, even under Chevron, the agency cannot give the statute a meaning that contradicts what
a court determines to be the clear meaning of the statute; nor can it give the statute a meaning
that a court determines to be unreasonable. But Chevron does empower agencies to resolve
ambiguities in statutes in reasonable ways that a court must accept even if the court regards
another interpretation as better. This is the power to interpret in the "strong sense."
130. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5.
131. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
132. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1196 ("[A]gencies must interpret to figure out how to act without
violating the law.").
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So what is the argument about? When the critics debate who
may interpret the law, they are using the word "interpret" in the strong
sense. Thus, for example, Hamburger in many places discusses what he
perceives as the irrelevance of "whether Congress authorizes agencies
to interpret." 133 But he cannot be discussing whether Congress has
authorized agencies to interpret statutes in the simple sense, because
agencies always, necessarily, have that power. He is discussing whether
Congress has authorized an agency to give a definitive interpretation to
statutes it administers.
The real question, therefore, is this: When an agency and a court
have both undertaken to interpret a statute, in the simple sense, but
the interpretations are different, whose interpretation controls? 134
Under Chevron, if the statute is ambiguous and the agency's
interpretation is reasonable, a reviewing court must uphold it even if
the court believes it is not the best interpretation. 135 Chevron's critics,
however, believe that a court reviewing an agency's interpretation of a
statute must apply independent judgment and must enforce what the
court believes to be the best interpretation of the statute. 1 3 6 The critics
sometimes express this point by saying that the question is whether the
agency should have power to interpret a statute, 137 but when they do,
"interpret" must be understood in its strong sense. Everyone agrees
that agencies have power to interpret statutes they administer in the
simple sense.
2. The Implication of the Critics' Constitutional Claim
It is also important to note an implication of the fact that the
critics are claiming that Chevron is not merely incorrect, but
unconstitutional. The critics do not merely claim that Congress has not
created a regime of Chevron deference, but that Congress could not
create a regime of Chevron deference. 138 To be sure, some of the critics
also make the former point-they question whether Chevron was
correct as a matter of statutory interpretation. 139 But this Essay
primarily addresses the critics' claim that Chevron is unconstitutional.
133. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197.
134. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that this is the "precise problem" (emphasis
removed)).
135. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984).
136. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Hamburger,
supra note 19, at 1205-10.
137. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1222.
138. E.g., id. at 1197.
139. E.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); Farina, supra note 38, at 468-76. For the response, see infra Section II.F.2.
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To refute the critics on this point, one need not show that
Chevron is a correct understanding of actual congressional desires, but
only that Congress could, if it wanted to, make Chevron the law. That
is, in responding to the critics, one is entitled to hypothesize that
Congress passes a statute expressly mandating a regime of Chevron
deference.
Imagine, therefore, that Congress does just that. Suppose that
Congress passes a statute-call it the "Chevron Implementation Act" or
"CIA" (it always helps if a statute has a memorable acronym)-
expressly mandating that courts apply the principles of Chevron
deference when reviewing agency action. 140 Precise language for the
CIA will be suggested below-for reasons that will become clear, the
statute needs to be worded a particular way.141 For now, just think of
the statute as mandating Chevron. The critics say that such a statute
would be unconstitutional. 142 To refute the critics, therefore, one need
only show that the statute would be constitutional.
B. The Essence of the Argument
In responding to Chevron's critics, this Essay begins by
conceding some of the key assertions in their arguments. Let it be
assumed that the critics are correct that there is a judicial duty to
exercise "independent judgment." Assume that this duty is
constitutionally based and cannot be displaced even by Congress.
Assume also that this duty requires judges to conduct de novo review of
interpretations given to legal instruments by the other branches of
government. One might challenge these assumptions-other scholars
have suggested that the judicial power, as originally understood, did
not invariably require courts to enforce their own, de novo
understanding of the meaning of legal texts143-but the point of this
140. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5. Monaghan hypothesizes that Congress enacts a
"reverse Bumpers amendment." Id. The "Bumpers amendment," which was never enacted, was
the SOPRA of its day. See id. at 2.
141. See infra Section II.E.
142. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197.
143. Monaghan, for example, devotes a section to examining Thayer's famous suggestion that
courts should strike a statute down as unconstitutional only when the statute clearly violates the
Constitution. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 7-11 (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)). Courts, Thayer
suggested, should not interpret the Constitution de novo. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). Rather
than simply enforcing "their own judgment" on constitutionality, courts should also consider "what
judgment is permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the duty
of making it." Id. In other words, Thayer suggested that courts should give deference to Congress's
interpretation of the Constitution in close cases. Monaghan says that the existence of judicial
review "demands nothing with respect to the scope of judicial review" and that "the judicial duty
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Essay is to demonstrate that the Article III critique of Chevron
deference is mistaken even if one cedes these points to the critics.
The first step in the response to the critics is simple and not new.
Monaghan published the core insight in 1983, before Chevron was
decided, and it was not new even then. As Monaghan acknowledged,
others had expressed the same idea in works going back as early as
1944.144
The core insight, as Monaghan expresses it, is that "[jiudicial
deference to agency 'interpretation' of law is simply one way of
recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency."145 That
is, an ambiguous agency statute is simply another way of doing
something that Congress does all the time-namely, authorize an
agency to make a policy choice. Innumerable statutes expressly
authorize agencies to make decisions and prescribe rules that have the
force and effect of law, 146 and such authorization is routinely approved
as constitutional.147
'to say what the law is' does not demand an independent judgment rule; it is in fact quite consistent
with a clear-mistake standard." Monaghan, supra note 24, at 9. Gillian Metzger similarly suggests
that there are "substantial arguments" that Article III does not "compel independent judicial
judgment for all questions of statutory interpretation." Metzger, supra note 19, at 41.
Aditya Bamzai suggests that early decisions employed a kind of "deference" principle, but one
different from modern Chevron deference: he suggests that early decisions reflect a practice of
giving judicial respect to a contemporaneous or customary construction of a legal text, which is not
necessarily the same as the executive branch construction. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 941, 944, 987 (2017). Under this practice,
Bamzai suggests, "a court would 'respect'-or, to use modern parlance, 'defer to'-an agency's
interpretation of a statute if and only if that interpretation reflected a customary or
contemporaneous practice under the statute." Id. at 987.
Thus, some might suggest that the critics are mistaken in their assertion that judges must
exercise independent judgment. The critics would of course respond; Hamburger, for example,
suggests that what Thayer regarded as a principle of deference is better understood as the
substantive measure of whether a law contradicted a higher law. Hamburger, supra note 19, at
1218-19. Therefore, Hamburger suggests, a judge who employed Thayer's practice of failing to
strike down a law unless the law were manifestly contrary to the Constitution would not be
"deferring" to the legislative judgment that the law is constitutional, and hence the Thayerian
view cannot justify judicial deference to administrative interpretation. Id.
In any event, this Essay does not engage this debate. It simply cedes this point to the critics.
144. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27.
145. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original). Lest anyone miss the significance of this point, Monaghan
put the whole sentence in italics. See id.
146. For just one out of an enormous possible number of examples, see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)
(making it unlawful "[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange . .. any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe. . . ." (emphasis added)).
147. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-74 (2001) (approving
statutory command that the EPA choose "ambient air quality standards" that are "requisite to
protect the public health" and noting that the Court has only ever struck down two statutes on
nondelegation doctrine grounds).
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If Congress can delegate power to administrative agencies to
make policy decisions, the precise form that the delegation takes should
be of little importance. What should matter is the power delegated, not
the form of the delegation. Therefore, delegating power to an
administrative agency by allowing it to resolve statutory ambiguity
should be valid whenever it would be valid for Congress to expressly
delegate the power to choose among the potential reasonable
interpretations of the statutory language.
This insight was not only articulated by Monaghan in 1983; it
was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1984 in Chevron. While Chevron
articulated several possible explanations for Chevron deference, 148 the
theory most prominently expounded was the one just given. The Court
explicitly analogized giving Chevron deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes to respecting the exercise of
powers expressly delegated to an agency. In the critical paragraph, the
Court said:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency. 149
That is, the Court adopted the notion that ambiguity in an agency
statute is to be considered an "implicit" delegation of power to the
agency, and this power should be analogized to the "express
delegations" of power to agencies that occur all the time.
Thus, the basic response to the critics is simple, already
established in the scholarly literature, and already unanimously
approved by the Supreme Court. Chevron deference is constitutionally
permissible because it is merely a way of conceiving of what Congress
is doing when it gives an agency ambiguous instructions. Permitting an
agency to resolve such ambiguity is "simply one way of recognizing a
delegation of law-making authority."150
So is the debate over? Not at all.
148. In addition to the main "delegation" theory discussed in the text, Chevron also hinted that
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes they administer because of agencies'
superior expertise and because agencies are more politically accountable than courts. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
149. Id. at 843-44 (footnote omitted).
150. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
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C. Responding to the Critics'Rejoinder
The critics are, of course, aware of the core insight discussed in
the previous Section. They deny that it shows Chevron deference to be
constitutional. Fine, the critics say, let it be assumed that Congress
intends every ambiguous statutory instruction it gives to a federal
agency to constitute a delegation of power to the agency to resolve the
ambiguity. That wouldn't matter. Congress, the critics say, cannot
displace the courts' duty to exercise independent judgment in
construing statutes. That duty derives from the Constitution and
cannot be changed by statute. Hamburger, for example, says that it
"makes no difference whether Congress authorizes agencies to
interpret... . [N]o amount of statutory authority for agencies can ever
relieve judges of their constitutional duty." 15 1
Thus, to refute the critics, one needs more than simply the core
idea previously articulated by Monaghan and embraced by the Supreme
Court. One must also respond to the critics' rejoinder to the core idea. 152
1. What Constitutes an "Interpretation"?
The key response to the critics' rejoinder is that Chevron
deference, properly understood, does not prevent a court from
interpreting statutes. An interpretation of a statute that determines
that the statute delegates authority to an administrative agency is still
an interpretation. Even if one accepts the critics' understanding of the
judicial duty of interpreting a statute-even assuming it to require a
court to exercise "independent judgment"-the result of exercising that
duty might still be the conclusion that Congress has vested the agency
with the power to make a policy choice.
Certainly there can be no Article III rule against a court's
interpreting a statute to delegate power to an agency. Courts do that all
the time, because statutes delegate power to agencies all the time. The
Communications Act of 1934, for example, authorizes the FCC to
"[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this chapter." 153 Even before Chevron the Supreme
Court interpreted this section to authorize the Commission to make
151. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197.
152. As will be noted below, Monaghan also anticipated some of the critics' rejoinder to his
core idea. But he could not fully respond to arguments that had not yet been made at the time he
wrote his article, such as the argument that Congress cannot take the interpretive power from
courts and give it to agencies. Given that powerful critics are currently attacking Chevron, it is
vital to respond fully to their arguments.
153. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2012).
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important decisions about communications policy, for example, to adopt
the "fairness doctrine." 15 4 It would be absurd to say that the Court, in
so holding, was abdicating its judicial duty to interpret the statute. The
Court interpreted the statute-it interpreted the statute to authorize
the agency to decide to impose the fairness doctrine.
Of course, that statute contained an express delegation of
authority. The question of what constitutes an "interpretation" is,
however, independent of the degree of clarity of the statute. A court that
holds that an ambiguous statute constitutes a delegation of power to
the agency is interpreting the statute-it is interpreting the statute to
authorize the agency to make a decision. The interpretation may be
right or wrong, but it is certainly an interpretation. 155
This insight addresses the critics' complaints about Chevron. For
example, as noted above, 1 56 Justice Gorsuch expresses the critics' point
by asking "where in [the Chevron two-step process] does a court
interpret the law and say what it is?"1 5 7 The answer is that the court
interprets the law when it determines that the law delegates power to
an administrative agency. The court says what the law is when it says
that the law is that an agency is vested with the power to make a certain
decision. An interpretation is no less an interpretation because it
determines that an agency has the power to make a choice. 158
The proper exercise of the judicial duty does not have to answer
every question. As the Supreme Court once remarked, the "judicial duty
is not less fitly performed" when the result of exercising that duty is a
determination that the court lacks jurisdiction. 1 59 Similarly, the judicial
duty is not less fitly performed when the result of exercising that duty
is a determination that Congress has vested power in an administrative
agency.
2. The Nature of the Power Conferred on the Agency
This conception of Chevron deference does require a subtle but
important shift in the conception of what kind of power Congress
implicitly delegates to an agency when it gives an agency an ambiguous
statutory instruction. It is often said that under Chevron an ambiguity
154. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
155. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27 ("To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it
must decide what has been committed to the agency.").
156. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
157. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
158. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27.
159. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
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in an agency-administered statute constitutes an implicit delegation of
power to the agency to interpret the statute. 160 Indeed, the Supreme
Court may have said this in Chevron itself. In the critical passages from
Chevron, the Court said:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation....
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency. 161
The Court's use of the terms "elucidate," "construction," and
"interpretation" suggest, even if they do not compel, the view that an
ambiguous term in an agency statute is to be taken as an implicit
delegation of authority to the agency to interpret the statute. The Court
also, however, referred to "an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities," 162 so the opinion was not perfectly clear
as to what kind of power an ambiguous statute implicitly delegates to
an agency. In any event, whether Chevron said it or not, the notion that
under Chevron ambiguous agency statutes are deemed to be delegations
of interpretive power has become common. 16 3 Moreover, in this
conception of Chevron, the term "interpret" is being used in the strong
sense explained earlier-necessarily so, as the agency always has the
power to interpret statutes in the simple sense.
160. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We
most often describe Congress' supposed choice to leave matters to agency discretion as an
allocation of interpretive authority."); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) ("[A]gencies enjoy broad power to construe statutory provisions over which they
have been given interpretive authority."); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) ("[W]hether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to
interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and administrative
constructions occur." (emphasis added)); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 215 (2002) ("[B]oth
[interpretations] fall within the Agency's lawful interpretive authority." (emphasis added)); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("Chevron recognized that Congress not only
engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that '[s]ometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.'" (emphasis added) (quoting
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))); Josendis v. Wall
to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) ("We apply Chevron deference
when an agency properly exercises its authority, expressly or implicitly delegated by Congress, to
interpret an ambiguous statute. . . ."); Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining what follows "if Congress expressly or implicitly delegated authority
to an agency to interpret a statute"); Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Chevron deference is predicated on the assumption that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an
'implicit delegation' to the agency to interpret the statute."); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d
200, 208 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to "[t]he delegated authority to interpret an ambiguous term").
161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
163. See supra note 160.
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In light of the critics' Article III argument, this conception of
Chevron, however accurate as a practical description of how Chevron
works, must be shifted. Congress, it should be recognized, does not give
agencies power to interpret ambiguous statutes that they administer, in
the strong sense of "interpret." As the critics observe, that power-the
power to definitively determine the meaning of statutes-belongs to the
courts. Agencies may (and indeed must) interpret statutes in the simple
sense, but only the courts can give them definitive meaning in a judicial
proceeding.
As explained above, however, when a court exercises the power
to interpret statutes, the court may determine that a statute's best
interpretation is that the statute confers power on the agency. The
power thus conferred should not be regarded as interpretive power, but
as the power to make a policy choice. 164 Specifically, it is the power to
choose to implement any of the reasonable interpretations of the
statute. An interpretation of an ambiguous statute as vesting such
power in the agency is an interpretation, and giving such an
interpretation to a statute may fulfill the judicial duty to exercise
independent judgment.
D. Some Examples
Some examples may help drive home the points made in the
previous Section. This Section considers examples of cases in which a
court determined that the best interpretation of an ambiguous legal
text was that it conferred power on another body to make a choice, and
yet no one would claim that the court shirked its duty to interpret the
legal text.
The examples are drawn from the Constitution. Of course the
Chevron debate concerns interpretation of statutes, but constitutional
examples provide useful illustrations of why the critics are wrong
regarding the implications of the judicial duty to apply independent
judgment. Constitutional examples are, in fact, especially useful,
because they should particularly favor the judicial role in
interpretation. The courts have long declared that giving the
Constitution definitive meaning is a peculiarly judicial function. 165
Congress often provides directives about how courts should interpret
164. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 6 ("A statement that judicial deference is mandated to
an administrative 'interpretation' of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial
conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency."
(emphasis added)).
165. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution. . . .").
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statutes, 16 6 but Congress cannot tell the courts how to interpret the
Constitution, and the Court's interpretation of the Constitution trumps
any interpretation given to it by Congress. 167 Therefore, if giving
determinate meaning to ambiguous language in a legal directive were
an inescapable part of the judicial duty to "say what the law is," then
one would expect to see this principle reflected most strongly in
constitutional interpretation. Contrariwise, if in interpreting the
Constitution courts may find that ambiguous language should be
understood as an implicit delegation of power to other branches of
government, it should follow a fortiori that the same is true in statutory
interpretation.
In fact, with regard to the legal directives contained in the
Constitution, the courts sometimes determine that the best
construction of ambiguous language is that it confers power on some
other body. Two excellent examples of courts doing so come from cases
involving the Constitution's Apportionment Clause and the closely
related Census Clause. These clauses provide:
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their
respective Numbers . . .. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. 1 6 8
These clauses seem reasonably clear at first glance-they
instruct the government to take a decennial census of the nation's
population and to apportion the House of Representative based on the
census. However, both clauses have subtleties that require elaboration,
and the Supreme Court has faced numerous important questions
regarding their meaning. 1 6 9 In answering these questions, the Supreme
Court did not always fully resolve the ambiguities in the clauses. In
some cases, the Court determined that the clauses vest discretion in
Congress to resolve ambiguities regarding what they mean.
166. See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012); see also infra Section II.E.
167. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 524 (1997) ("The design of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress
has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
States.... The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the
Judiciary.").
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This Essay uses
the term "Apportionment Clause" to refer to the first sentence quoted above and "Census Clause"
to refer to the second sentence. The term "Census Clause" is sometimes used to cover both
sentences. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 473 (2002).
169. In addition to the cases discussed in the text below, see, for example, Department of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999), which addresses the use of
statistical sampling techniques in conducting the census; and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788 (1992), which addresses the allocation of military service members stationed overseas for
apportionment purposes.
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In Utah v. Evans,170 for example, the Court considered the
Census Bureau's practice of using "imputation" to count the number of
inhabitants at addresses from which the Bureau's census questionnaire
is not returned. Under this practice, the Bureau assumes that such an
address has the same number of inhabitants as a nearby, similar
address. 171 Utah, which lost a representative as a result of the Bureau's
use of imputation in the 2000 census, brought suit. It noted that the
Census Clause requires the government to conduct an "actual
Enumeration" of the nation's population. It argued that this term, both
textually and historically, means that the government must conduct the
census as an actual count of individuals; the term, Utah asserted,
forbids the use of estimation.172
The suit presented a classic question of interpretation, namely,
the meaning of the phrase "actual Enumeration" in the Constitution. If
Chevron's critics were right, it was the duty of the Supreme Court to
exercise its independent judgment in fixing the meaning of that phrase.
But while the Court exercised its independent judgment in interpreting
the phrase "actual Enumeration," the result was an interpretation that
left the question at issue for resolution by Congress. The Court held:
[T]he text uses a general word, "enumeration," that refers to a counting process without
describing the count's methodological details.... The final part of the sentence says that
the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by
Law direct," thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional methodological authority,
rather than its limitation. 173
The Court did not shirk its duty to construe the Census Clause.
It applied all of the usual interpretive techniques: it considered the text
of the clause, 174 its drafting history,1 7 5 and its purposes. 176 The result of
that interpretive exercise, however, was the conclusion that "the
Framers ... did not write detailed census methodology into the
170. 536 U.S. 452.
171. The Census Bureau attempts to count the nation's inhabitants by sending a questionnaire
to every address and following up with multiple personal visits to addresses from which the
questionnaire is not returned. Sometimes, however, despite the Bureau's best efforts, it is unable
to determine how many people live at a given address. Under the imputation practice, the Bureau
assumes that a problematic address has the same "occupancy characteristics" (including the same
number of inhabitants) as the nearest similar neighbor that also did not return the Bureau's
questionnaire, but whose characteristics were successfully determined through follow-up visits.
See id. at 458.
172. See Brief of Appellants at 17-18, Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (No. 01-714).
173. Evans, 536 U.S. at 474.
174. See id. at 475-76 (considering contemporary dictionary definitions of "enumeration").
175. See id. at 474-75 (considering the changes made to the clause at the Constitutional
Convention).
176. See id. at 477-79.
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Constitution."1 7 7 The Court's role was therefore enforcing only such
limits as the clause imposed, while respecting the choices made by
Congress within those limits, in the exercise of the power that the
clause conferred on Congress. As the Court concluded: "[W]e need not
decide here the precise methodological limits foreseen by the Census
Clause. We need say only that in this instance .. . those limits are not
exceeded." 178
Utah v. Evans shows that the result of a court's independent
interpretation of a controlling, ambiguous legal text may be the
conclusion that the text confers discretion on some other decisionmaker.
Even Justice Thomas, who dissented, did so only because he disagreed
with the Court's construction of the phrase "actual Enumeration"; he
thought that the text and history of that phrase indicated that it
demanded an actual, individualized count of persons and prohibited the
use of imputation or other estimating techniques.1 7 9 He did not suggest
that the Court was obliged to give a definitive construction to the
phrase, or that the Court's determination that the phrase allowed
Congress to choose whether to use estimating techniques amounted to
an abdication of the judicial function.
Of course, Utah v. Evans implicated the Census Clause's
provision that the census would be conducted "in such Manner as
[Congress] shall by Law direct." This phrase expressly delegates some
discretion to Congress. But another constitutional case shows that even
without such express delegation, the best interpretation of an
ambiguous, controlling legal text may be that it implicitly delegates
discretion.
United States Department of Commerce v. Montana180 concerned
the Constitution's Apportionment Clause, which provides that
"Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States ...
according to their respective Numbers." 181 This clause contains a clear
command but also has a hidden ambiguity. On the one hand, it clearly
requires state representation in the House of Representatives to be
apportioned according to population, unlike in the Senate, where each
state has equal representation. 182 On the other hand, in implementing
this constitutional command, one inevitably runs into an ambiguity
caused by the problem of fractions. When parceling out representatives
to the states according to population, there are always fractions left
177. Id. at 479.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 489 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
182. Id. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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over, 183 yet each state's number of representatives must be an
integer. 184 So what is to be done about the fractions?
After trying different methods over the decades,185 Congress,
following the 1940 census, finally settled on a method known as "the
method of equal proportions," 186 which apportions representatives in a
way that minimizes the relative (i.e., percentage) difference between
the sizes of congressional districts in different states.187 Montana,
which would have gained a representative in the 1990 apportionment if
the apportionment had instead minimized the absolute difference
between the sizes of congressional districts,1 8 8 brought suit and claimed
that the method used violated the Apportionment Clause. 189
As with Utah v. Evans, the case presented a classic question of
interpretation: What is the meaning of the constitutional command that
representatives be apportioned to the states "according to their
respective Numbers"? 190 Does it require that an apportionment
minimize relative population differences, absolute population
183. The total number of representatives is not specified in the Constitution but was
statutorily fixed at 435 in 1911, see Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62-5, § 2, 37 Stat. 13,
and is today maintained at that figure by 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012), which requires a decennial
reapportionment of "the then existing number of Representatives." With the total number
specified, it might seem that the Apportionment Clause could be implemented in two simple steps:
First, determine the size of the average "ideal" congressional district by dividing the national
population by the number of representatives. Second, determine the number of representatives to
which each state is entitled by dividing each state's population by the size of the ideal district. The
problem is that when one performs the latter divisions, there are fractions left over. Today, for
example, the ideal congressional district contains about 711,000 people. See Kristin D. Burnett,
Congressional Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen20lO/briefs/c2OlObr-08.pdf [https://perma.cclHLN5-ZPUV]
(showing a national population of 309,183,463, which, divided by 435, yields an ideal congressional
district of 710,767 people). How many districts, therefore, should be apportioned to a state with a
population of, say, one million? If such a state received two congressional districts, it would be
overrepresented in Congress; if only one, it would be underrepresented.
184. See Montana, 503 U.S. at 448 ("Because each State must be represented by a whole
number of legislators, it was necessary either to disregard fractional remainders entirely or to
treat some or all of them as equal to a whole Representative.").
185. Congress has sometimes provided that after dividing each state's population by the size
of an ideal district, fractions must simply be ignored (that is, each state's representation must be
"rounded down" to the nearest whole number). Id. at 449. At other times Congress has provided
for an extra representative to be given to those states for which the fraction is greater than one-
half. See id. at 450. Congress has used other methods as well. See id. at 448-51.
186. Congress settled on the method of equal proportions based on advice received from an
expert committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences. The method was codified in
1941 and has remained in place ever since. Id. at 451-52, 452 n.25, 464 n.42, 465.
187. Id. at 454-55.
188. Id. at 445.
189. Id. at 446; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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differences, or something else? 191 The key point is that the Supreme
Court did not choose any of these possible constructions for the clause.
Instead, the Court unanimously interpreted the clause to delegate
power to Congress to choose among alternative reasonable methods of
solving the fractions problem inherent in apportionment. 192 The Court
said:
What is the better measure of inequality-absolute difference in district size, absolute
difference in share of a Representative, or relative difference in district size or share?
Neither mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provides a conclusive
answer.... The polestar of equal representation does not provide sufficient guidance to
allow us to discern a single constitutionally permissible course. . . . The constitutional
framework that generated the need for compromise in the apportionment process must
also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion. 193
Did the Court abdicate its judicial duty? Did it fail to say what
the meaning of the Apportionment Clause is? Of course not. The Court
interpreted the Apportionment Clause. The interpretation was that the
clause-like many constitutional clauses 194-delegates power to
Congress. The power delegated by the clause is limited. Congress must
make a choice that can reasonably be said to apportion representatives
to the states according to their respective numbers.195 But the Court's
191. Montana asserted that the clause required that the apportionment "achieve the greatest
possible equality in the number of individuals per representative." Montana, 503 U.S. at 446.
Montana observed that if it received one more representative, and the state of Washington one
fewer, the total deviation of all districts from the ideal size would go down, and it argued that the
statutory apportionment was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 461. The Court, however, observed
that while Montana's proposed apportionment would reduce the total absolute difference between
the size of the actual districts and the size of an ideal district, it would increase the total relative
difference. Id. at 461-62. Under Montana's proposed apportionment, if one took the difference
between the population of each of Washington's districts and the population of an ideal district,
and did the same for each of Montana's districts and added up all the differences, the total sum
would be 209,165, whereas the sum of the differences in the actual, statutory apportionment was
260,550. Id. Thus, Montana's proposed apportionment would have reduced the overall absolute
difference in population between actual and ideal districts. However, in Montana's proposed
apportionment, the size of Montana's districts would have differed from those of ideal districts by
42.5 percent and Washington's by 6.7 percent, whereas in the actual apportionment those
differences were only 40.4 percent and 5.4 percent. Id. at 462 n.40. Thus, Montana's proposed
apportionment would have increased the relative difference in population between actual and ideal
districts.
192. Id. at 464.
193. Id. at 463-64 (emphasis added).
194. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
195. Surely, for example, Congress could not use any method of apportionment that caused
any state to receive fewer representatives than a state with a smaller population. It also seems
safe to say that, even if that condition were satisfied, an apportionment would not comply with the
clause if the relationship between population and representation were not at least close to linear.
For example, an apportionment that varied representation with the square root of population
would satisfy the requirement that bigger states got more representatives than smaller states, but
would surely be unconstitutional. (Under such an apportionment, a state with a population of ten
million would receive more representatives than a state with a population of one million, but only
about 3.2 times more, rather than ten times more.)
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interpretation of the clause was that the clause, while setting the
requirement of apportioning the House of Representatives by
population, delegated to Congress the power to choose among
reasonable methods of resolving the fractions problem that such
apportionment inevitably entails.
Of course, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Apportionment Clause might be right and it might be wrong. Perhaps
the best understanding of the clause is that it fixes forever a precise
method of dealing with the fractions problem; perhaps the best
understanding is (as the Court held) that the clause delegates power to
Congress to resolve the problem and even allows Congress to vary its
resolution over time. The key point, however, is that the latter
interpretation, whether right or wrong, is surely an interpretation. The
Court said what the meaning of the Apportionment Clause is; the
meaning is that the clause vests power, within limits, in Congress.196
Whether the Court's interpretation is right or wrong, the Court fulfilled
its judicial duty, exercised independent judgment, and interpreted the
Apportionment Clause, even though the result of that interpretation
was the determination that the clause leaves certain choices up to
Congress.
Thus, these examples show that even in the field of
constitutional interpretation, where the judicial role in giving meaning
to legal language is at its zenith, sometimes the best interpretation of
ambiguous language is that it vests decisionmaking power in a body
other than the courts. A court may reach such a conclusion without
violating its duty to exercise independent judgment regarding the
meaning of the legal texts it is called upon to enforce.1 97
Once this point is understood, the Article III objection to
Chevron is defeated. The analogy between the constitutional examples
and Chevron deference is surely clear, but to spell it out: the Census
196. Actually, the Apportionment Clause does not specify who shall make the apportionment;
it simply states in the passive voice that representatives "shall be apportioned among the several
States ... according to their respective Numbers." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
The power of Congress to make the apportionment follows from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which authorizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id. art. I, § 8. Thus, it
is really the two clauses together that vest Congress with implicit authority to resolve the fractions
problem. See Montana, 503 U.S. at 464 (citing the Necessary and Proper Clause).
197. Of course, given that the critics are willing to challenge the unanimous decision in
Chevron, they might not accept the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Department of
Commerce v. Montana either. But it seems impossible that anyone could claim that the Court
abdicated its judicial duty in that case. The Court interpreted the Constitution to delegate
resolution of the fractions problem to Congress. One might disagree with that interpretation, but
it seems impossible that anyone could claim that Article III forbids it.
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Clause and the Apportionment Clause are like ambiguous agency
statutes. They clearly delegate some power to Congress, just as an
agency statute delegates power to an agency. But they are ambiguous
regarding important details as to how the delegated power is to be
exercised. The Court interpreted the instrument delegating the power
as implicitly delegating, to the entity receiving the power, the power to
choose among the reasonable possible resolutions of the ambiguity.
Whether that interpretation is right or wrong, it is surely an
interpretation. The Court may have erred, but it did not violate Article
III. Similarly, when a court determines that an ambiguous agency
statute is best understood as delegating to the agency the power to
choose among the possible reasonable interpretations of the statute, the
court is interpreting the statute. Its interpretation may be right or
wrong, but it is still an interpretation.
E. The Analogy to Express Statutory Delegation
The previous sections established that a court's interpretation of
an ambiguous legal text may determine that the text confers authority
on some decisionmaker other than the court. Another route to the same
conclusion is to recognize that once an ambiguous statute is understood
as an instruction to an agency to choose among the possible reasonable
interpretations of the statute, the authority it confers is no different
from the authority that statutes confer on agencies all the time, with no
possible Article III objection.
Even the critics recognize that Article III poses no intrinsic
barrier to Congress's conferring discretion on an agency. Hamburger,
for example, says that nothing in his article "questions the ability of
judges to uphold an agency rule, unless they uphold it out of Chevron
deference to the rule's interpretation of a statute." 198 Thus, even the
critics accept that as far as Article III is concerned, Congress could
expressly confer on an agency the authority to make any decision that
Chevron deference allows it to make. 199 But Chevron deference is just
another way to confer the same authority.
Consider, for example, the decision made by the EPA in Chevron
itself. Chevron concerned the EPA's decision about the meaning of the
term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act, which imposed stringent
permits requirements on "new or modified major stationary sources" of
198. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200.
199. Some critics might still object to the delegation of such power on other grounds,
particularly the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., PHiLiP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? 11, 378-79 (2014).
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pollution.200 The EPA initially interpreted the term "stationary source"
to apply to each piece of pollution-emitting equipment, 20 1 so that in
regions covered by the statute the permit requirements applied
whenever pollution emissions increased from any single piece of
equipment. Subsequently, however, following a change in
administrations, the EPA implemented a scheme known as the "bubble
concept." 202 It reinterpreted the term "stationary source" to mean an
entire covered plant, with the result that a plant owner, without the
need for a permit, could increase emissions from one part of its plant,
provided there were offsetting decreases elsewhere in the same plant. 203
The Supreme Court, after articulating the rules of Chevron deference,
upheld the agency's new definition on the ground that it was a
reasonable interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean
Air Act. 204
Even the critics accept that, insofar as Article III is concerned,
Congress could have expressly authorized the EPA to make the decision
it made. Suppose that the Clean Air Act had set forth its permit
requirements and had then provided:
The EPA shall by rule determine whether the permit requirements of this Act shall apply:
(a) to every new or modified piece of pollution-emitting equipment within a plant, or
(b) only to a new plant or a plant that as a whole increases its emission of pollutants.
In such a case, even the critics would accept that Article III
would pose no barrier to the agency's exercising the authority conferred
by the statute.205 Congress would simply have conferred on the agency
discretion to make a policy choice. Congress does that all the time. The
barrier to such delegation of discretion would, if anything, be the
nondelegation doctrine, not Article III.
Chevron deference, however, is nothing more than the
generalized functional equivalent of the statute just hypothesized. It
merely confers on agencies discretion to make the policy choice among
the potential reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language.
This is particularly true when one recalls that, because the
critics are claiming that Chevron is unconstitutional, defenders of
Cheoron's constitutionality are permitted to posit that Congress has
200. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
201. Id. at 857-59.
202. Id. at 857-58.
203. Id. at 857-59.
204. Id. at 865-66.
205. See Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200.
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passed a statute expressly instructing courts to apply Chevron.206 Let
us do just that. It is time to provide language for the statute
hypothesized earlier. Suppose that the "Chevron Implementation Act"
or "CIA" provided:
Any provision of a statute that is administered by an agency and that is susceptible of
more than one reasonable interpretation shall be deemed to set out the provision's
possible, reasonable interpretations as permitted alternatives and to authorize and direct
the agency to choose and implement one of the permitted alternatives.
Under this hypothetical CIA, ambiguous statutory language,
such as the actual Clean Air Act language that was at issue in Chevron,
would be deemed to set out its possible, reasonable interpretations as
permitted alternatives. That is, the actual Clean Air Act language at
issue in Chevron would be deemed to be rewritten as the hypothetical
language suggested above, giving the EPA the policy choice between
implementing the bubble concept and applying the permit
requirements to each piece of equipment.
Such a regime would maintain the constitutional roles of courts
and agencies, even as the Chevron critics conceive those roles. A court
reviewing an agency's implementation of an ambiguous statute would
determine the meaning of the statute. In accordance with the CIA, that
meaning would be an instruction to the agency to implement one of the
statute's possible, reasonable interpretations. The agency would
exercise the policy discretion conferred by the statute. 207
Note that the hypothetical CIA does not authorize the agency to
interpret an ambiguous agency statute, in the strong sense of
"interpret." Monaghan, in hypothesizing a Chevron-implementing
statute, imagines that the statute "mak[es] explicit that a court must
accept every published administrative statutory interpretation so long
as it has a 'reasonable basis in law.' "208 To answer the Chevron critics,
however, the hypothetical CIA imagined here does not confer
interpretive power on agencies. An agency implementing an ambiguous
statute will, necessarily, interpret the statute in the simple sense of
determining what it means so that the agency may follow it, and the
agency will apply the CIA in that process. The power to interpret the
statute in the strong sense remains with the courts, although, in
206. See supra Section II.A.2.
207. This point also addresses Farina's claim that regarding ambiguities in agency statutes as
implicit delegations of power logically implies that there is no distinction between the legislative
and judicial roles. Farina, supra note 38, at 477. The roles remain distinct. Under the CIA, courts,
exercising "the mind-set of the Interpreter," id. at 478, would determine the potential range of
reasonable meanings that an agency statute could bear; that statute would then be understood to
instruct the agency to implement one of the reasonable alternatives.
208. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5 (emphasis added).
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accordance with the CIA, the court will interpret the statute to confer
policy discretion on the implementing agency.
The ability of Congress to pass a statute like the hypothetical
CIA shows that Chevron does not violate Article III. Discretion
conferred on an agency via statutory ambiguity is equivalent to
discretion expressly conferred to choose among statutory alternatives.
Before leaving this Section, however, it is necessary to address several
potential objections to the arguments just made.
1. Is Chevron Deference Really the Same as Discretion Expressly
Conferred?
Professor Hamburger would object to the previous argument. He
would object to the suggestion that Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is equivalent to an agency's
exercise of policy discretion expressly conferred by statute, and that
Chevron deference therefore does not entail an agency's exercising the
judicial power to interpret law. He would say:
Such an argument is correct in assuming that agencies use their interpretation of statutes
as a means of making law, but it goes too far when it assumes that administrative
interpretation therefore is not an attempt to say what the law is. Undoubtedly,
interpretation can function as a mode of making law, but this does not mean it is not also
interpretation. 20 9
This objection, however, would fail under the regime of the CIA.
Hamburger's argument is that agencies cannot exercise their power to
make social policy decisions in a way that usurps the judicial power of
interpretation. However, the judiciary has an exclusive claim to
interpretive power only in the strong sense. If the CIA were in place, an
agency giving content to an ambiguous statute would be doing no more
than interpreting the statute in the simple sense. But everyone agrees
that agencies can do that.
An agency implementing an ambiguous statute under the
regime of the CIA would of course have to interpret the statute in the
simple sense of determining what the statute means. As noted earlier,
everyone, including Hamburger, recognizes that agencies may (and
indeed must) interpret statutes in this sense. 210 But with the CIA in
place, an agency conducting its interpretation of an ambiguous statute
would have to apply the rule of the CIA; that is, the agency would have
to determine that the statute should be deemed to set forth its possible
reasonable interpretations as permitted alternatives and to instruct the
agency to choose one of the alternatives. Doing so would be part of
209. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1220.
210. See id. at 1196.
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simply determining what the statute means so that the agency can
implement it.
The agency's interpretation would not be interpretation in the
strong sense. It would still be up to a reviewing court to give a definitive
construction to the statute. Of course, in accordance with the CIA, the
court, if it agreed that the statute was ambiguous, would also need to
deem the statute to set forth its possible reasonable interpretations as
permitted alternatives and to instruct the agency to choose one of the
alternatives. The court's determination of what the permitted
alternatives are would be definitive. Thus, the power to interpret the
statute in the strong sense would remain with the court.
The critics would doubtless complain that this regime would
simply be the functional equivalent of Chevron deference. But that's the
whole point. The point of imagining the CIA is to show that by giving
appropriate interpretive instructions, Congress could transmute the
process by which agencies construe ambiguities in statutes from
forbidden strong-sense interpretation to permitted (and indeed
necessary) simple-sense interpretation.
Under the hypothetical CIA, a court would still definitively
interpret an ambiguous agency statute. The court would definitively
determine that the statute conferred authority on the agency to exercise
discretion to make a policy choice. The court would also definitively
determine the limits of the agency's discretion. As shown earlier, an
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that determines that the statute
confers discretion on an agency is still an interpretation. With the
hypothetical CIA in place, it would be the correct interpretation.
2. Could Congress Really Give Such an Interpretive Instruction?
A critic might also question whether Congress could really give
courts (and agencies) the general interpretive instruction that the CIA
would give. Can Congress tell courts how to interpret statutes? The
answer is yes.
As I have previously explained, 2 1 1 the power to give instructions
inherently includes the power to say how those instructions should be
understood. Just as a boss may instruct an employee that, "whenever I
say 'mail this,' I really mean 'make a copy of this, put the copy in my
box, and mail the original by ordinary, first-class mail,"' so too any giver
of instructions may give rules for interpreting those instructions.
Congress cannot give the courts instructions as to how to interpret the
211. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1500-05 (2000).
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Constitution, 2 1 2 because Congress is not the source of the instructions
in the Constitution. But the People, who are the source of the
Constitution, can and did include in it instructions as to how the
Constitution should be construed. 213 Similarly, Congress, the giver of
statutory instructions, may provide by statute for how those
instructions are to be interpreted. 214
Congress does this frequently and uncontroversially. Congress
passes statutes that include interpretive instructions such as defining
terms for the statute involved (this is extremely common), 215 or
providing more generalized interpretive directions such as a rule that a
statute is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes. 216 Statutes
such as the Dictionary Act even provide definitions or interpretive
principles that apply to other statutes generally. 217
One might still question, however, whether Congress could give
the interpretive instruction in the proposed, hypothetical CIA. It is one
thing, one might say, for Congress to include a "definitions" section in a
statute or even for it to give general definitions applicable to all
212. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court cases affirming
the judiciary's role as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution).
213. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as
to Prejudice any [territorial] Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."); id. amend.
IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."); id. amend. XI ('The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.");
id. amend. XVII ("This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of
any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.").
214. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2106-07. Rosenkranz agrees that Congress has a
"vast" power to "codify some tools of statutory interpretation," id. at 2088, and that this power
includes the power to provide not only definitions applicable to a particular statute, id. at 2105,
but also definitions applicable to all statutes, id. at 2117-20, and more general interpretive
instructions, such as statutes that codify or abrogate judicially developed interpretive canons. Id.
at 2109; see also 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 27:1, at 604 (7th ed. 2009) (explaining that a legislature may provide statutory
definitions or "directives specifying how provisions in the same statute or other statutes are to be
construed and applied").
Rosenkranz correctly points out that there are some limits to Congress's power over
interpretation. Congress could not, for example, require courts to defer to the constructions placed
on a statute by a specified congressional committee after the statute is passed, as such a
requirement would constitute a delegation of power to Congress itself in violation of the anti-
aggrandizement principle of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986). Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2134. But Chevron does not violate the rule against self-
delegation, as it vests power in the executive, not in Congress itself.
As noted earlier, see supra note 19, Rosenkranz suggests that Chevron is unconstitutional, but
the arguments made in Sections II.B and II.C address his point insofar as it is based on a judicial
duty to interpret statutes de novo.
215. See almost any federal statute, really, but for a particular example, see 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012), which provides numerous definitions of terms used in the Copyright Act.
216. Siegel, supra note 211, at 1502.
217. Id. at 1502-03.
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statutes, as in the Dictionary Act. Does it really follow that Congress
can give generalized, mind-bending interpretive instructions such as
those posited in the CIA, under which a statute that says one thing is
to be deemed to say something entirely different?
The answer is, or at least should be, yes. Existing statutes
provide that other statutes shall be deemed rewritten in specified ways,
and courts apply these interpretive instructions. Such deeming is, for
example, common when powers of one agency are transferred to
another. For example, following the transfer of functions from
numerous agencies to the new Department of Homeland Security,
Congress provided:
With respect to any function transferred[,] .. . reference in any other Federal law to any
department, commission, or agency or any officer or office the functions of which are so
transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary, other official, or component of the
Department to which such function is so transferred. 2 18
Courts have enforced this provision, 219 and there are numerous
other statutes stating that statutory language that says one thing shall
be deemed to say something else. 2 2 0 A provision of the Dictionary Act
even says that "[t]he word 'company' or 'association', when used in
reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words
'successors and assigns of such company or association', in like manner
as if these last-named words, or words of similar import, were
expressed."221 It is thus commonplace for Congress to instruct courts to
deem statutory language to be rewritten in specified ways.
Moreover, courts conduct such mind-bending statutory
rewriting even without congressional instruction, particularly when
doing so saves a statute's constitutionality. Doing so with congressional
instruction should therefore certainly be possible.
Consider two examples, one well known, the other less so. The
well-known example is National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius ("NFIB"),222 the case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (also known as
218. 6 U.S.C. § 557 (2012) (emphasis added).
219. E.g., Scheerer v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1251 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008).
220. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4191 (2012) (providing that statutes in Title 18 of the Revised Statutes
that expressly apply only to particular classes of consular officers shall be deemed to apply as well
to all other classes of such officers, plus other State Department employees designated by the
Secretary of State); 22 U.S.C. § 6571 (providing, similarly to 6 U.S.C. § 557, that statutory
references to agencies whose functions had been transferred shall be deemed references to other
agencies); 26 U.S.C. § 6665(a)(2) (2012) (providing that references to "tax" in the tax code shall be
deemed to refer also to tax penalties and additions to tax), enforced, Carroll v. United States, 339
F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).
221. 1 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (emphasis added), enforced, Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922
F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991).
222. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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"Obamacare") against constitutional challenge. In doing so, the Court
upheld the statute's "individual mandate" that all Americans purchase
health insurance. The key opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, achieved
this result by reconceiving the nature of the mandate. 223 Chief Justice
Roberts first determined that Congress lacked power under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose the
individual mandate directly. 2 24 But he then saved the mandate by
recharacterizing it, not as a direct command to buy health insurance,
but as a tax on not buying health insurance. He did so even though
"[t]he most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands
individuals to purchase insurance," 225 even though the Court held that
the mandate is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, 2 2 6 and
even though the statute describes the payment required of those who
fail to fulfill the mandate as a "penalty," not as a "tax." 227 In other
words, the Chief Justice saved the mandate by rewriting the statute
that imposed it to say something quite different from, although
functionally equivalent to, what it actually said. In doing so, the Chief
Justice was expressly motivated by the need to save the statute's
constitutionality. 228 NFIB thus shows that a court may deem statutory
language rewritten in a different way.
One might, perhaps, try to dismiss NFIB as sui generis; the
reasoning of such a momentous and politically charged case should not,
one might say, be assumed to apply routinely. But the routine, little-
known case of Durousseau v. United StateS229 shows that the principle
that statutes can be notionally rewritten in different language is a
general one.
Durousseau involved a question of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is given by Article III of the
Constitution, subject to "such Exceptions ... as the Congress shall
make." 23 0 That is, Congress does not have power to give appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court; it has the power to make exceptions
to the appellate jurisdiction given to the Court by the Constitution. And
yet, as the Court observed, Congress has not purported to make
223. Id. at 561-70.
224. Id. at 546-61.
225. Id. at 562.
226. Id. at 546.
227. Id. at 564.
228. See id. at 562 ("[I]f a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the
Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.").
229. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). Durousseau, decided over two hundred years ago, has been
cited about one hundred times in Westlaw's JLR database. NFIB was decided less than a decade
ago, yet has already been cited more than 1,800 times.
230. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but has
passed statutes describing that jurisdiction affirmatively. 2 31 Does this
mean that the statutes are ineffective? Not at all. Speaking through
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court said that the statutes' affirmative
description of the Court's appellate jurisdiction "has been understood to
imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it."232 That is, although the statutes were phrased
as affirmatively giving jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the Court was
willing to deem them to be written differently. If the statutes
collectively say that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over cases meeting criteria X, Y, or Z," the Court deems the
statutes to say that "the Supreme Court shall not have appellate
jurisdiction over cases not meeting criteria X, Y, or Z."
Again, in agreeing to perceive the statutes as being written quite
differently from their actual language, the Court was motivated by
constitutional considerations. The Court said that "[w]hen the first
legislature of the union proceeded to carry the third article of the
constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute
the power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court." 23 3 Thus, where a statute's actual
language appears to be an exercise of power Congress does not
constitutionally possess (e.g., conferring appellate jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court), a court may deem the statute to be rewritten in
different language that would achieve the same result but by exercising
a power Congress does possess (e.g., making exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
The interpretive attitude on display in NFIB and Durousseau
helps rescue Chevron from the critics. Those cases show that courts
have a duty, where possible, to construe statutes in a way that saves
their constitutionality, even deeming the statutes to be rewritten in
different language where necessary. Therefore, even if one concedes the
critics' claim that Article III prohibits Congress from conferring
interpretive power on agencies, courts would have a duty to deem
statutes that appear to do so rewritten in a way that saves their
constitutionality. In accomplishing this, the hypothetical CIA would
only reinforce what would already be a judicial duty.
231. 10 U.S. at 314.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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3. Is That How Chevron Really Works?
The critics might further object that the CIA is too clever by half.
The statute, they might say, is not an accurate picture of how Chevron
really works. The attempt to envision Chevron as a delegation of power
to make policy choices ignores, the critics might argue, the reality that
Chevron effectively delegates interpretive power to agencies. The critics
might also point out that even under the hypothetical CIA, courts would
in all likelihood not interpret an ambiguous agency statute by spelling
out all the reasonable possible interpretations and determining
whether the agency had properly exercised its power to choose among
them; courts would simply determine whether the one interpretation
arrived at by the agency was reasonable. Again, the critics would argue,
this suggests that the agency is really exercising interpretive power.
The CIA, they might argue, shouldn't fool anyone.
The critics would have a point. Even if the legal world
reconceived Chevron as deeming ambiguous agency statutes to
constitute delegations of policymaking power rather than interpretive
power-indeed, even if the hypothetical CIA were in place-the regime
of Chevron would as a practical matter be equivalent to one in which
Congress delegated interpretive power to agencies. Moreover, the
conception that ambiguous statutes delegate interpretive power might
seem a more natural fit for Chevron's practical impact than the
conception that they delegate policymaking power.
But this is not fatal to Chevron's constitutionality. Again, NFIB
and Durousseau are instructive. They show that when a statute's
practical effect may be conceived in different ways, one constitutional
and the other unconstitutional, the courts should favor the
constitutional conception, even when it is the less natural one. The
practical effect of statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
in specified cases and statutes excepting jurisdiction in all other cases
is the same, but the Court in Durousseau adopted the latter,
constitutional conception of the statutes at issue even though the
statutes' wording was far more consistent with the former. In NFIB the
Court characterized the individual mandate as a constitutional tax even
though in both language and practical effect it was a penalty. Indeed,
in NFIB the Court performed even further gymnastics when it
conceived the individual mandate as a tax for constitutional purposes
even as it determined that the mandate was not a tax for purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act. 2 3 4 So the fact that Chevron can be conceived,
234. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 546 (2012).
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and indeed might more naturally be conceived, as deeming ambiguous
statutes to delegate interpretive power is not fatal.
Nor is it a problem that in practice, even if the CIA were in effect,
courts would not likely interpret ambiguous agency statutes by spelling
out every possible reasonable interpretation and treating the result as
a menu from which the agency might choose, but would determine only
whether the particular choice made by the agency is permitted. Courts
often decide no more than is necessary to determine the result of a
case. 2 3 5 In the Utah case discussed above, for example, having
determined that the Census Clause delegated to Congress the power to
choose among reasonable census methodologies, the Supreme Court did
not determine the full set of potential reasonable methods; it
determined only that the method chosen by Congress was among
them. 2 3 6 Indeed, when construing the Constitution, the Court
frequently leaves matters to future development, 237 but that does not
mean that the construction that the Court does give to the Constitution
is not an interpretation. Similarly, if a court can dispose of a case by
interpreting a statute sufficiently to decide the issues before it, the
court need not determine every detail of the statute's meaning for its
reading to be an interpretation.
In sum, the Article III objection to Chevron deference fails.
Properly understood, Chevron does not wrest the interpretive power
from courts and give it to agencies. It leaves courts to interpret agency
statutes, but under an implicit rule (which could be made explicit by
Congress's passage of the hypothetical CIA) that ambiguous statutes
are to be deemed to delegate policy discretion to agencies. An
interpretation of a statute that determines that the statute delegates
discretion is still an interpretation.
F. Addressing Other Critiques
The main point of this Essay, now hopefully accomplished, is to
address the critics' Article III objections to Chevron. Addressing other
235. See, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984) ("Following our
usual practice of deciding no more than is necessary to dispose of the case before us, we express no
opinion on [an issue not before the Court].").
236. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 479 (2002).
237. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (determining that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is subject to some regulation, but not "undertak[ing] an
exhaustive historical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment").
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objections to Chevron is not the main point. Still, this Section addresses
some other significant points made by the critics.
1. Hamburger's "Bias" Objection
As noted above, Hamburger, in addition to arguing that Chevron
unconstitutionally strips the interpretive power from courts and gives
it to agencies, also argues that Chevron violates the Due Process Clause
by requiring courts to show deference to one of the parties to a case (in
Chevron cases in which the government is a party). 238 The previous
sections of the Essay also refute the bias argument by showing that
Chevron deference can be assimilated to judicial review of agency action
taken pursuant to express delegation of authority.
There is no bias when a judge enforces a statute that expressly
delegates authority to an administrative agency. Innumerable statutes
expressly delegate authority to an agency to make some decision-say,
to set the maximum levels of a pollutant in the air 2 3 9 or drinking
water 240 in accordance with a statutory standard. In such cases, when
the agency exercises the power delegated to it, judicial review is
routinely held to be available only for rationality. 241 Challengers of the
agency's action therefore labor under the same burden as to which
Hamburger complains-they can win only if they convince a reviewing
court that the agency's action is not only wrong, but irrational. The
agency has a clear advantage. And yet no one would claim that courts
are unconstitutionally showing bias in favor of agencies in such cases.
The agencies have the advantage simply because courts will necessarily
permit the agencies to exercise the power conferred on them by statute.
Indeed, as noted earlier, even Hamburger's article does not
question the ability of courts to uphold agency regulations passed
pursuant to an express delegation of authority. 242 If, for example, the
238. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1211-13.
239. See, e.g., Nat'l Envtl. Dev. Ass'n's Clean Air Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 812-13 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (concerning such an action under the Clean Air Act).
240. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(concerning such an action under the Drinking Water Act).
241. See, e.g., Nat'l Envtl. Dev., 686 F.3d at 810 ("Although we must perform a 'searching and
careful' inquiry into the facts, we do not look at the decision as would a scientist, but 'as a reviewing
court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of
rationality.'" (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc))); Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1216 ("Happily, it is not for the judicial branch to undertake
comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence. Our review aims only to discern whether
the agency's evaluation was rational.").
242. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200. Note that this paragraph is limited to objections
posed in the Hamburger article under discussion. Hamburger's other works question the power of
agency rulemaking more generally. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 199, at 11, 378.
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statute at issue in Chevron itself had expressly delegated to the EPA
the power to choose between applying the Clean Air Act's permit
requirements to each piece of equipment within a plant or only to entire
plants, as hypothesized earlier,243 Hamburger's article would not
question letting the agency make that choice, and no one would assert
that a court was showing "bias" in approving the agency's exercise of
the express power to choose from among statutory alternatives. Of
course an agency is empowered to make a selection from among choices
expressly stated in a statute. The court would simply have determined
that the agency was properly exercising statutory power expressly
delegated to it.
But under the hypothetical CIA, an ambiguous agency statute is
deemed to be rewritten as an express delegation of power to make a
policy choice among the statute's reasonable possible interpretations.
Therefore, there would be no "bias" when a court first interprets an
ambiguous agency statute in the way Congress has instructed, and then
enforces the agency's action within the power delegated to the agency.
Courts would not be showing bias toward agencies in approving such
choices; they would simply be approving agency power deemed to have
been expressly delegated.
In other words, the bias argument does not add anything to the
attack on Chevron's constitutionality. If Article III allows courts to
deem an ambiguity in an agency statute to be a delegation of power to
the agency to make a policy choice among the potentially reasonable
interpretations of the ambiguous statutory provision, then the Due
Process Clause does not prohibit courts from allowing the agency to
exercise the power thus conferred.
2. Questioning Whether Congress Intended Chevron Deference
The main focus of this Essay has been on the critics'
constitutional critique of Chevron. Some of the critics, however, also
question whether Chevron is correct as a matter of statutory
construction. Justice Gorsuch argues that there is little evidence that
Congress actually intends statutory ambiguities to constitute
delegations of authority to agencies. 244 Professor Farina devotes a
section of her article to the same point.245
On this issue, the critics have a good point. Congress has never
passed the hypothetical CIA. Congress's actual direction to courts with
243. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
244. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
245. Farina, supra note 38, at 468-76.
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regard to legal issues that arise in judicial review of administrative
action, insofar as one exists, is § 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. That statute provides that "[t]o the extent necessary to decision
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action." 2 4 6 While this language is not, perhaps, completely inconsistent
with deferential review, it is surely suggestive of a de novo standard. 247
Indeed, Kenneth Culp Davis made this point almost apoplectically in
his famous Administrative Law Treatise decades ago.2 48
It is not the purpose of this Essay to defend Chevron against the
charge that it misconstrues Congress's actual direction to courts
regarding statutory interpretation. Perhaps the best that can be said is
that Congress's silence in the face of the long-standing judicial decisions
giving deference to agency statutory construction-particularly since
Chevron but going back even before that249-suggests that Congress is
not averse to Chevron deference. Of course, reasoning from
congressional silence is always dangerous, and never more so than in
an area in which such silence is imagined to give rise to an inference
that Congress has delegated power to the executive. In such an area the
president would likely veto any congressional attempt to reclaim the
power, and so it would be particularly difficult for Congress to defeat
the inference by express action. So the suggestion that courts may infer
congressional approval of Chevron from Congress's failure to overturn
it is offered tepidly, only so that this critical argument might receive
some response. The real response is that Congress could eliminate any
doubt about its intent by passing the hypothetical CIA.
3. Does Chevron Make Obedience to Law Harder?
Justice Gorsuch adds the suggestion that Chevron makes it more
difficult for ordinary citizens to obey the law. He complains:
246. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added).
247. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that § 706 "contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve
ambiguities in statutes and regulations").
248. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLEMENT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 507-26 (1989). Davis was particularly upset that the Court was
not following what he regarded as the clear command of § 706 that a reviewing court "shall decide
all relevant questions of law." He quoted that language more than twenty separate times (five
times as a block quote), id. at 509-13, 515-16, 518-19, 525, and said that "[t]he contrast between
the statutory words and the Court's words could hardly be stronger." Id. at 510.
249. See, e.g., supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Under Chevron the people aren't just charged with awareness of and the duty to conform
their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a detached magistrate can muster.
Instead, they are charged with an awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether the
statute will be declared "ambiguous" (courts often disagree on what qualifies); and
required to guess (again) whether an agency's interpretation will be deemed "reasonable."
Who can even attempt all that, at least without an army of perfumed lawyers and
lobbyists? 2 5 0
Putting aside Justice Gorsuch's reference to "perfumed"
lawyers, 251 this attack on Chevron seems misguided. It is certainly true
that it can be difficult for ordinary citizens to discern the meaning of
complex statutory law that they are nonetheless assumed to
understand. 252 But Justice Gorsuch provides no evidence that Chevron
makes things worse on this point. After all, even in areas where Chevron
does not apply (or before Chevron was decided), the public faces (or
faced) the same difficulty of discerning the meaning of statutory texts.
It took years of litigation and conflicting lower court opinions before the
Supreme Court finally decided, for example, that the Americans with
Disabilities Act requires professional golf tournaments to make
accommodations for disabled golfers, 253 that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
did not apply retroactively, 254 and that plaintiffs in a class action cannot
aggregate claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction. 2 5 5 Justice Gorsuch implicitly suggests that the
public may predict "the fairest reading of the law that a detached
magistrate can muster" easily, or at least more easily than the public
can predict the outcome of statutory interpretation under Chevron's
deference regime, but he offers no evidence that this is true. Yes, courts
may disagree as to whether a statute is ambiguous and whether an
agency's interpretation is reasonable, but courts might disagree about
the meanings of statutes even if there were no such thing as Chevron
deference.
250. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
251. Presumably, Justice Gorsuch is not seriously suggesting that lawyers who wear perfume
serve an especially elite clientele. Perfume is seemingly used here as a metaphor for high costs.
Justice Gorsuch appears to be appealing to populist resentment against members of the elite who
can afford to hire high-priced lawyers to help them decipher and exploit obscure legal
requirements.
252. E.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) ("All citizens are presumptively charged
with knowledge of the law.").
253. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (noting conflicting decisions in the
courts of appeals on this point).
254. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (determining that Congress
had no intent for the statute to apply retroactively). For conflicting lower court decisions, see, for
example, Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1993), which holds the act to be
retroactive and notes that the holding "break[s] ranks with the other circuits that have decided
this issue".
255. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334 (1969) (noting conflict in circuits).
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4. Does Chevron Violate the Nondelegation Doctrine?
As noted earlier, some of the critics acknowledge that the alleged
Article III problem with Chevron might be ameliorated by regarding the
power implicitly delegated to agencies by an ambiguous statute as being
not the power to interpret the statute, but rather the power to make a
policy choice.256 They suggest, however, that so conceived, Chevron may
violate the nondelegation doctrine. 257 Congress, these critics suggest,
may no more give agencies the legislative power than it may give them
the judicial power. Chevron, they contend, makes a mockery of the
nondelegation doctrine's requirement that statutes granting discretion
to agencies must lay down an "intelligible principle" to guide that
discretion. 258
There can be little doubt that the nondelegation doctrine has
failed to live up to that promise. Courts apply the "intelligible principle"
test in theory but in practice approve delegations of power restricted by
principles that can only be called unintelligible. Courts approve
delegations limited by standards such as that rates be "just and
reasonable," 2 59 or that an agency's actions serve "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity," 2 60 even though these empty standards are
open to "any conceivable interpretation."261 Courts applying the
"intelligible principle" test regularly find "intelligible principles where
less discerning readers find gibberish." 262 The result is that "supposed
limitations on delegations of legislative power are little more than a
legal joke." 2 63
So the critics are correct that the nondelegation doctrine does
little to enforce its supposed restraints on the delegation of legislative
power to executive agencies. Again, however, what is missing from the
critics' arguments is any real showing that Chevron makes things worse
256. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (noting ambiguity); Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1206-10 (discussing the
decisionmaking power of judges); supra text accompanying note 81 (noting Justice Gorsuch's
concurrence).
257. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the
"potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron
deference"); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153-54 ("The fact is, Chevron's claim about
legislative intentions is no more than a fiction. . .
258. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153-54.
259. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600M1 (1944).
260. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
261. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 474 (1985).
262. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2002).
263. Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 161 (2013).
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in this regard. Recall that, as noted earlier, Congress might have
expressly delegated to an agency any choice that it is deemed under
Chevron to have delegated implicitly via ambiguity. 2 6 4 Such an express
delegation of power to make a policy choice might or might not violate
the nondelegation doctrine (almost certainly not, these days), but if it
does not, a functionally equivalent implicit delegation of power to make
the same choice should be equally valid. The nondelegation doctrine is
about whether the executive is capable of receiving a given
choicemaking power at all, not about whether Congress confers the
power implicitly or explicitly.
True, the nondelegation doctrine theoretically demands that
Congress lay down an "intelligible principle" to guide power delegated
to an executive agency. But as just noted, courts are willing to let almost
any standard satisfy this test. A general standard could easily be
provided by the hypothetical Chevron Implementation Act. Recall that
the CIA language given earlier provided that an ambiguous provision
in an agency statute shall be deemed to set out its reasonable
interpretations as alternatives and to authorize and direct the
implementing agency to choose one of the alternatives. 2 6 5 A second
sentence could easily add that "In making this choice, the agency shall
be guided by the purposes of the statute containing the ambiguous
provision." That would suffice for nondelegation doctrine purposes. 266
Justice Gorsuch argues that Chevron makes things worse (from
the perspective of the nondelegation doctrine) by permitting agencies to
change their interpretations of ambiguous statutes over time. 2 6 7
Permitting such vacillation, he argues, erodes the limitations that the
nondelegation doctrine requires on the exercise of delegated power. 268
Again, however, Chevron makes things no worse on this point. Agencies
are equally allowed to change the rules they make when acting
pursuant to express delegations of power.269 Any vacillation permitted
264. See supra Section II.E (discussing how Article III does not bar Congress from expressly
delegating the authority to an agency to make any decision that would otherwise be made under
Chevron).
265. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
266. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426-27 (1944) (approving the delegation
of power to fix certain prices in a way that "the prices fixed shall be fair and equitable, that in
addition they shall tend to promote the purposes of the Act").
267. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (noting that agencies that are able to change rules from one day to the next offer little
"substantial guidance" or "clearly delineated boundaries').
268. See id. (stating that Chevron serves to place the power of determining the meaning of the
law in the hands of those who are charged with enforcing the law).
269. In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), for example, the Supreme
Court upheld the EPA's revision of its National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") against
a nondelegation challenge. In holding that the scope of discretion conferred by the relevant statute
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by Chevron could equally be permitted by an express delegation of
power to make a policy choice accompanied by express authorization to
vary that choice over time in response to changing social and political
conditions (such authorization could also be added to the hypothetical
CIA to apply generally). Again, there might or might not be a
nondelegation problem, but if there is one, it derives from the scope of
the power conferred, not from the fact that the power is conferred
implicitly via statutory ambiguity.
Perhaps what Justices Thomas and Gorsuch mean is that the
principle of Chevron deference violates nondelegation as it should be-
a robust, reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine of the kind that Justice
Thomas has hinted he might be willing to adopt.270 That may well be
true. If the nondelegation doctrine were more robust, it might forbid
empowering agencies to make the choices that Chevron posits Congress
has delegated to them. But such a vigorous nondelegation doctrine
would equally undermine Congress's ability to delegate those same
choices to agencies expressly. Again, the issue is the vast degree of
delegation that the Court has approved, not the way that Chevron
allows the delegation to be implicit rather than express.
Alone among the critics, Professor Farina provides some reasons
why Chevron makes things worse in terms of the nondelegation
doctrine. She suggests that when the Supreme Court loosened the
nondelegation doctrine by inventing the "intelligible principle" test 2 7 1
and the requirement that statutory standards be sufficiently clear that
a reviewing court could tell whether they were being obeyed,272 the
Court reached a "constitutional accommodation" whereby extra power
could be delegated to agencies provided there was judicial policing of
the limits on that power. 273 The result was not, Farina suggests, simply
was "well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents," id. at 474, the Court looked at
the content of the applicable statutory standard. It noted that the statute required the EPA to set
the NAAQS at a level "requisite . . . to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety."
Id. at 475-76 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court barely mentioned the fact that the
statute allowed, and indeed required, the agency to change the NAAQS over time; it mentioned
that the NAAQS "reflect the latest scientific knowledge." Id. at 473. But this seemed of little
relevance to the nondelegation holding.
270. See supra note 78.
271. Farina, supra note 38, at 483-84.
272. Id. at 485-86.
273. Id. at 487. Of course, some authorities would deny that the nondelegation doctrine
permits some delegation of lawmaking authority, provided the authority be sufficiently
circumscribed, preferring instead to say that the doctrine permits the delegation of some
decisionmaking authority (provided the authority be guided by an intelligible principle), but not
any lawmaking power whatsoever. Compare Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (holding that the
Constitution permits no delegation of the legislative power), with id. at 488 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the rulemaking power delegated to the agency should be forthrightly
characterized as legislative).
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that the Court approved extra delegation of power; rather, that
approval occurred as part of a bargain that included a certain level of
judicial review. Chevron, Farina suggests, undoes the terms of that
bargain by permitting agencies to interpret the limits of their own
powers 274 and also contributes to a dangerous accumulation of power in
the executive branch.275
One might respond with the same response given above to the
other critics: whatever decisionmaking authority Congress implicitly
confers on agencies by virtue of Chevron, Congress could have conveyed
to agencies expressly. 2 76 The authority conferred might or might not
violate the nondelegation doctrine, but the form by which the authority
was conferred should make no difference. Once again, therefore,
Chevron makes things no worse from a nondelegation perspective.
Farina, however, might suggest that this analysis assumes that
whenever Congress vests an agency with authority via an ambiguous
statute (thereby triggering Chevron deference), Congress would be
willing to vest the agency with the same authority via an express
delegation. But this is not necessarily true. Yes, one possible reason for
statutory ambiguity is that Congress desired to vest the agency with
authority and chose to do so by using broad or ambiguous statutory
language. 277 However, it is also possible that competing factions within
Congress each desired to give the agency clearer instructions but
neither side had the votes to clarify the statutory text in its preferred
way, 2 7 8 or that members of Congress thought the statutory language
was clear and did not know that they were delegating authority to the
agency. 279 The principle of Chevron deference applies without regard to
which of these reasons might be the true reason for statutory
ambiguity. 280
Thus, Farina could argue, Chevron deference does make things
worse from a nondelegation perspective, because it does more than
simply approve intentional, but implicit, delegations of power that could
have been made explicit. It also enhances agency powers in situations
in which Congress did not imagine that it was delegating power at all. 281
The former delegations might be just as valid as express delegations,
but the additional, "accidental" delegations might further enhance
274. Farina, supra note 38, at 487-88.
275. Id. at 497-98.
276. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
277. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Farina, supra note 38, at 468-76, 497-98 (discussing this problem).
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executive power to the point where the balance between the branches
is irretrievably upset.
This argument does bring out a difficulty with Chevron doctrine.
Chevron's assumption that every ambiguity in an agency statute
represents a congressional delegation of power to the agency is probably
false. Congress does sometimes intentionally use broad or ambiguous
language for the purpose of vesting authority in an agency, 282 but
statutory ambiguity also arises for other reasons. 283 Allowing agencies
to resolve ambiguities that accidentally arise enhances agency power.
We could limit Chevron to cases in which a court determines that
Congress deliberately, or at least not purely accidentally, used
statutory ambiguity as a device to delegate authority, but such
determinations would be very difficult for courts to make, as the
legislative record might often provide no solid evidence as to the reason
for a statutory ambiguity. 28 4 This difficulty may underlie Chevron's
presumption that statutory ambiguity represents implicit delegation. 285
Three points help rescue Chevron from Farina's suggestion that
it violates the nondelegation doctrine. First, Farina's argument is
partly rooted in her doubt as to the accuracy of Chevron's presumption
about the likely reason for statutory ambiguity-she asserts that the
Supreme Court had no basis for assuming that ambiguity represents
implicit delegation.286 Congress could, however, address this part of the
problem by passing the hypothetical CIA. If Congress provided by
statute that ambiguity does represent implicit delegation, there would
be no doubt that Congress desired Chevron deference in all cases of
statutory ambiguity.
Moreover, such an expression of congressional desire would
narrow the set of cases where Chevron deference would do any more
than express delegation. As noted above, to the extent that Chevron
deference provides only an alternative vehicle for Congress to make
delegations of authority that it could have made expressly, it should not
282. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 995-97 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that congressional staff sometimes "quite
intentional[1y]" draft ambiguous language for an agency to administer "because regulators have
the expertise and things get worked out better by the agency" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283. Id.; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212 ("Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized statement of
legislative desire .... .").
284. Farina, supra note 38, at 470; John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1950-51 (2015).
285. Farina, supra note 38, at 470.
286. Id. at 470-71.
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matter from the standpoint of the nondelegation doctrine. 287 Chevron
provides agencies with genuine additional authority only to the extent
that it creates situations where Congress is deemed to have delegated
authority to agencies even though it did not intend to. But if Congress
stated that it did intend every ambiguity in an agency statute as a
delegation of authority, we would have Congress's own assurance that
its delegations via ambiguity were the equivalent of (and indeed under
the CIA should be deemed to be rewritten as) express delegations. Both
practically and legally that would likely result in fewer unintentional
delegations than one might currently believe exist.
Finally, even if some residue of unintentional delegations of
authority might still exist in a world in which Congress has adopted the
CIA, it seems unlikely that the additional authority thereby granted to
agencies would make a decisive difference from the perspective of the
nondelegation doctrine. As acknowledged above, such unintentional
delegations do represent an additional accumulation of power within
the executive. But the extra power involved pales in comparison to the
amount delegated expressly. Congress has, with judicial approval,
turned over broadcast policy to the FCC, 2 8 8 the setting of prices to a
Price Administrator, 289 and the determination of what constitutes
"unfair methods of competition" to the FTC.290 By comparison to these
enormous powers, the additional power to choose among reasonable
constructions of unintentionally ambiguous provisions of agency
statutes seems small. To accept the enormous powers conferred
expressly but to regard these additional powers as unconstitutional is
to swallow the camel and strain at the gnat.
CONCLUSION
The recent constitutional attacks on Chevron are misdirected.
Chevron does not wrest the interpretive power from courts and give it
to the executive. Even accepting the critics' claim that courts must
exercise "independent judgment" when determining the meaning of
statutes, Chevron does not prevent courts from exercising such
judgment. Chevron does not prevent courts from fulfilling their duty to
287. See supra text accompanying notes 264, 276.
288. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (approving a statute
authorizing the FCC to grant broadcast licenses on the basis of serving the "public interest").
289. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944) (approving a statute authorizing a
Price Administrator to fix commodities prices, provided that they be "fair and equitable").
290. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1919); see also A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532-33 (1935) (distinguishing the FTC Act from a
statute held to violate the nondelegation doctrine).
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interpret statutes. An interpretation of a statute that concludes that
the statute delegates power to an executive agency is still an
interpretation.

